Changing modes of foreign policy

Ankara’s opening to the Arab countries under the AKP is rooted in structural changes in foreign policy during the past two decades, specifically the introduction of an economy-driven foreign policy.³ Perceived as a shift away from the security-focused policy of the 1990s, scholars described this change as the emergence of a “trading state” with possible positive implications for regional peace.⁴ The AKP elites’ em­phasis on economic relations as an element of foreign policy also reflected the post–Cold War assumption that economic liberalisation would bring security, stability and democracy.

Indeed, Turkey’s ruling elites closely followed global developments (and continue to do so) as they moved to recalibrate foreign policy in line with the post–Cold War situation and an emerging identitarian understanding of world affairs. They noted that “the new dynamics of multiple modernities and multi­direc­tional ‘glocalisation’”,⁵ prompted by a “civilisational outlook”,⁶ would help Turkey to capitalise on its geographical position through its cultural, reli­gious and linguistic ties to its immediate and far neigh­bourhood.⁷ The aim was to “overcome traditional dichotomies such as the East versus West, Europe versus the Middle East”.⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu – a found­ing member of the AKP, chief advisor to then Prime Minister Erdoğan between 2003 and 2009, Min­ister of Foreign Affairs until 2014, and finally prime minister himself between 2014 and his ousting in 2016,⁹ firmly believed that Turkey had a specific role to play not only in resurrecting the so-called Islamic civilisation but also in bridging it to the West.¹⁰

Economic motivations, identitarian out­look and diversification of actors shape the AKP’s approach to foreign policy.

As well as its economic motivations and civilisational underpinnings, the diversification of actors in the design and conduct of foreign policy also dis­tinguishes the AKP’s approach from earlier periods. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) has been increasingly complemented, at times even sidelined, by organisations such as the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Presidency of Reli­gious Affairs (Diyanet), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities, the Yunus Emre Institute, the Turkish Maarif Foundation, and pro-AKP NGOs, think tanks and business associations. Humanitarian and cultural diplomacy have become active components of foreign policy.

Turkey’s economic overtures to MENA

The MENA countries follow Europe and Central Asia as one of the main destinations for Turkish exports.¹¹ The region’s share of overall Turkish exports in­creased from 12.4 per cent in 2002 (US$4.5 billion) to 22.2 per cent in 2020 (US$37.6 billion).¹² Since 2002, Turkey has signed Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with a succession of Arab countries (see Table 1).¹³ In 2022, Iraq, the UAE, Egypt and Morocco were among Turkey’s top twenty export destinations.¹⁴

The region’s young and growing population offers opportunities for Turkish businesses. While the AKP leadership initially sought to use economic ties to foster regional peace and elevate Turkey to regional power status, businesses simply wanted to open up new markets. For instance, in 2006 the Union of Cham­bers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) initiated the “Industry for Peace Initiative in Palestine”, which proposed an industrial zone on the border between Israel and the Gaza Strip.¹⁵ The project was frozen in 2009 due to tensions between Turkey and Israel following the 2006 Gaza war,¹⁶ and was moved to Jenin the following year.¹⁷ The protocol estab­lishing a council for economic cooperation be­tween Turkey and Palestine became effective in 2017, and the council held its first meeting the following year.¹⁸

Business councils have also been key to Turkey’s economy-driven foreign policy approach. Turkey’s Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK) has become a key actor facilitating Turkish investment abroad. While its origins date back to 1985, new legislation in 2014, following the Erdoğan-Gülen fallout,¹⁹ ex­panded DEİK’s responsibilities to conducting “foreign economic relations on behalf of the Turkish private sector”.²⁰ Turkey established business councils with Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia in the 1990s, adding Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE in the second half of the 2000s.

Since its rise to power, the AKP leadership has aimed to create a Muslim business community, embracing Turkish and Arab alike.

Since its rise to power, and even more so after the Arab uprisings, the AKP leadership has aimed to create a Muslim business community, embracing Turkish and Arab alike.²¹ Speaking at a conference organised by the Palestinian Business Forum in Tunisia in 2012, for instance, the President of Tur­key’s Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD), which has close ties to the AKP, welcomed “the rise of Islamic countries in economy and politics”.²² The Muslim Brotherhood–affiliated Egyptian Business Development Association was established the same year and signed a cooperation agreement with MÜSİAD “to join an international business forum that will allow Egyptian and Turk­ish businesses to network and Egyptian entrepreneurs to attend educational workshops”.²³ In 2012, 92 coun­tries participated in the International Convention and International Business Forum organised by MÜSİAD. That same year the region hit a historical record of 32.1 per cent of all Turkish exports (around US$49 billion).²⁴

The main Turkish exports to the MENA region are chemicals, food, steel, furniture, paper, electrical and electronic goods, and textile products. The Arab Baro­meter for 2022 places Turkey among the top five coun­tries regarded as producing the highest quality at low prices – together with Germany, the United States, China and France.²⁵ Turkish products have the reputation of being affordable (“as cheap as their Chinese counterparts”) and of high quality (“similar to European products”).²⁶ Palestinians overwhelmingly consider Turkey a preferred economic partner.²⁷ A con­­siderable proportion of Jordanians,²⁸ Algerians and Moroccans²⁹ also think that economic relations with Turkey should be strengthened.

Arab societies also encounter Turkey as an economic actor in the construction sector. Turkish con­tractors have been a presence across the region since 1972, when Turkey commenced construction projects in Libya.³⁰ Between then and 2021, Turkish com­panies have undertaken 11,125 projects in 131 coun­tries, with a total value of US$453 billion.³¹ Under the AKP, the value of international projects undertaken by Turkish contractors increased from US$4.4 billion in 2002 to US$30.7 billion in 2021.³² 24.8 per cent of these projects were in the Middle East and 17.8 per cent in Africa, with Iraq (6.9 per cent), Saudi Arabia (5.3 per cent), Algeria (4.4. per cent), Qatar (4.1 per cent), and the UAE (2.8 per cent) taking the lead.³³ In 2022 forty Turkish companies were listed among the top 250 international companies based on revenues generated from overseas income, placing third after China (78) and the United States (41).³⁴

Growing people-to-people contacts

If Ankara’s diverse and expanding economic en­­gagement contributes to the view that Turkey is an economically powerful actor, so do the growing people-to-people contacts associated with soft-power instru­ments such as humanitarian aid and cultural diplomacy. Turkey has also become a popular tourist destination for MENA under the visa-free regime in­tro­duced during the first decade of the 2000s by For­eign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Between 2000 and 2022, the number of visitors from MENA increased almost ninefold,³⁵ while the region’s share of the total number of tourists increased from 6.3 per cent to 13.2 per cent. In contrast, the proportion of visitors origi­nat­ing from European members of the OECD decreased during the same period from 56.8 per cent to 38.3 per cent.³⁶

Growing people-to-people contacts associated with various soft-power in­struments contribute to Turkey’s popularity.

As well as the mobility that visa liberalisation offered to citizens from many Arab countries, access to perceived European standards at cheaper prices also increases the country’s attractiveness (or did so until recently). Over the past two decades, Turkey has become a popular medical tourism destination. Tour­ism income attributable to health expenditure increased from US$203 million in 2003 to US$2 bil­lion in 2022, accounting for around 4.5 per cent of total tourism income in 2022 (up from 1.4 per cent in 2003).³⁷

Similarly, Turkey’s relatively better infrastructure and services compared to many other non-Gulf Arab countries and the appeal of a perceived European lifestyle in a majority Muslim country also play a role, as encapsulated by the saying: “Alcohol on one side, and mosque on the other”.³⁸ The ease of practising Muslim rituals such as fasting and prayer and the ordinariness of the headscarf in daily life contribute to positive attitudes towards the country.

Besides tourism, migration is another key factor generating contact between the MENA region’s citizens and Turkey. Today, approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees reside in Turkey under temporary protection status,³⁹ mostly in Istanbul, followed by the south-eastern border cities of Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa and Kilis.⁴⁰ There are also several hundred thousand political exiles of different nationalities (mostly Islam­ists).⁴¹ The neighbourhoods of Başakşehir, Fatih, Esenyurt and Şirinevler in Istanbul have considerable Arab diasporas.

Some of the migrants from the MENA region also acquired citizenship in the last couple of years. Al­though not the only path to citizenship, real estate in­vestments have been widely used to this end. Amend­ments to the Turkish Citizenship Law in 2009 paved the way for foreign nationals to invest in the housing market. With the transition to the presidential system in 2018, the President acquired responsibility for granting naturalisation, which had previously been the responsibility of the Council of President.⁴²

Those “who obtain a residence permit by investing within the scope and amount determined by the Presi­dent” and “foreigners who hold the Turquoise Card” may acquire citizenship. “Buying at least US$500,000 (or equivalent foreign currency or Turk­ish lira) worth of real estate investment fund share or venture capital investment fund share with the con­dition that they cannot be sold for at least three years” is one such criterion for foreign investors.⁴³ The share of house sales to foreign nationals increased from 1.1 per cent in 2013 to 4.5 per cent in 2022.⁴⁴ Citizens of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen in­vested prominently in the Turkish housing sector be­tween 2015 and 2022.⁴⁵ Buyers from MENA accounted for around 40–45 per cent of foreign property pur­chases between 2015 and 2019, declining to 31 per cent in 2020 and 21 per cent in 2022.⁴⁶

Last, but not least, education has also been a driver of social connectivity between Turkey and the Arab countries. Between 2017 and 2021, the number of in­ter­national students in Turkey increased from 108,076 to 224,048, ranking behind the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Canada and France.⁴⁷ In Turkey, students from Arab states con­stitute the majority of these, with 29,803 in 2017 and 94,075 in 2021. Some students from MENA fund their own study, while others receive scholarships from Turkish institutions.

Turkish defence industry: Manifestation of hard power

Ankara’s deployment of hard power and the coun­try’s growing defence industry also contribute to the perception that Turkey has become a regional power under AKP rule. As a significant aspect of Turkish trade, defence exports increased from 883 million in 2011 to US$3.2 billion in 2021.⁴⁸ In 2021, Turkey was among Europe’s ten most militarised countries.⁴⁹

Although the ambition to create a home-grown defence industry goes back to the 1970s, the AKP leadership has significantly developed and expanded it.⁵⁰ The sector has grown continuously during the past two decades, most remarkably since 2016.⁵¹ This period coincides with Turkey’s deployment of mili­tary power outside its own borders, exemplified by its military incursions into northern Syria between 2016 and 2019, its crucial military support for Azerbaijan during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, and its brinkmanship in the Eastern Mediterranean in 2019–2020. Ankara’s pronounced emphasis on defence and security since 2016 also tallies with the political and economic need to recalibrate foreign policy, in light of the regional rivalry triggered by the AKP’s support of Sunni Islamists.⁵² Last but not least, it also coincides with the end of the AKP’s informal partnership with the Gülenists, which heralded the failed coup attempt in 2016 and the formation of a new alliance with the ultranationalist actors.⁵³

Turkey being the “only Muslim country producing drones” is a typical comment.

Turkey has deepened defence and security relations with various Arab countries, including Algeria, Qatar, Tunisia, and, most recently, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Turkey also sells defence products, the best known being its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones). In the MENA, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have so far pur­chased Bayraktar TB2 drones produced by the defence manufacturer Baykar – which is owned by the family of Erdoğan’s son-in-law Selçuk Bayraktar.⁵⁴ Most recently, Saudi Arabia signed a deal with Baykar to manu­facture drones there.⁵⁵ Egypt was also recently reported to be purchasing drones from Turkey.⁵⁶ The developments in the Turkish defence industry, as manifested in Ankara’s militarised foreign policy and its expanding defence sales, seem to earn admiration in the Arab world. “Not even the Saudis or Emiratis can produce drones” and Turkey being the “only Mus­lim country producing drones” are typical comments.⁵⁷

Turkey’s political system: Between political representation and majoritarianism

Erdoğan won the run-off elections on 28 May 2023, gain­ing 52.2 per cent of the vote on an 84 per cent turn­out. He will rule the country for another five years, violating the constitutional limit of a maximum of two terms. His People’s Alliance (between the AKP and various far-right nationalist and Islamist parties) holds a majority in parliament. Until the next elections in 2028, Erdoğan and the AKP will strive to stabilise the presidential system that grants the executive unchecked powers over the legislative and judiciary.

Before the 2023 elections, enthusiasm about Tur­key’s democratic resilience⁵⁸ and a possible opposition victory was not rare among Turkey observers and Turkish voters. An ideologically diverse set of oppo­sition parties came together – for the first time in modern Turkey – on the basis of their objection to the presidential system.⁵⁹ Notwithstanding criticisms about certain aspects of the opposition alliance, there was a reasonable expectation that Turkish citizens would be able to vote an autocrat out of office.

Party competition has been a long-standing feature of the Turkish political system.⁶⁰ The country’s demo­cratic legacy goes as far back as 1876, with the proc­lamation of the (first) Ottoman Constitution and the founding of the Ottoman Parliament. Voting rights were extended to women in 1934, earlier than in France, Greece or Switzerland. Competitive elections have been held since 1950, although governments and legislative bodies have been intermittently sus­pended or discontinued. Turkish citizens regard voting as the primary means of expressing their politi­cal views and holding political actors account­able.⁶¹ Turnout rates have historically been high, with the lowest being 64.3 per cent in 1969 and the highest 93.3 per cent in 1987.⁶²

Even though elections held before the AKP’s rise to power were not immune to transparency issues,⁶³ and there have been systematic irregularities in Kurdish cities since at least the 1990s, Erdoğan’s gradually yet steadily expanding grip over the media and the blur­ring boundaries between the AKP and the state insti­tutions have exacerbated the situation and fundamentally distorted the fairness of elections. Patronage in distribution of resources, political manipulation and control of rivals through coercion and cooptation, electoral gerrymandering,⁶⁴ and criminalisation and stigmatisation of opponents through (extra)legal means now lend Erdoğan and the AKP an overwhelming competitive advantage.⁶⁵ Reflecting a majoritarian understanding of democracy, the AKP leadership sees the ballot box not only as a source of legitimacy, but also as a means to capture and consolidate power.⁶⁶

The relatively more competitive nature of the Turkish political system and high turnout seem to appeal to many Arab citizens.

Nevertheless, the relatively more competitive nature of the Turkish political system, with the existence of ideologically diverse political parties and high turnout, seems to appeal to many Arab citizens across the MENA region, which, according to some measures, “continues to be the most authoritarian region in the world”.⁶⁷ In Egypt only 41 per cent of eligible voters cast their vote in the 2018 elections that resulted in the re-election of President Abd al‑Fattah as-Sisi with 97 per cent of the votes.⁶⁸ Even in Tunisia, one of the few MENA states with relative competition, the President Kais Saied has reversed nearly a decade of democratic gains by expanding his control over institutions after dissolving the government in 2021.⁶⁹ A majority of Iraqi citizens see par­liamentary elections as significantly flawed.⁷⁰ In Libya, hopes for elections in late 2021 were crushed. Given their poor economic conditions, weak or failed governance structures captured by corrupt patronage networks and narrow interests, and continuous cur­tailment of political and civil rights, many Arab states suffer from a legitimacy crisis.

The “Turkish model”: A remedy at critical turning points?

Despite its increasingly authoritarian elements, the Turkish political system’s apparent appeal is arguably driven by the widespread disenchantment with politi­cal representation in the region. Despite initial optimism about the future of democracy across MENA during the Arab uprisings,⁷¹ the authoritarian elites have proven resilient. According to the Arab Opinion Survey 2022, the proportion who think that “the Arab Spring is presently facing obstacles but will eventually achieve its aims” dropped from 60 per cent in 2014 to 40 per cent in 2022.⁷² 39 per cent of those surveyed in 2022 think that the “Arab Spring has come to an end and the old regimes are returning to power.”

The question of popular legitimacy only partially explains Turkey’s popularity under Erdoğan’s leader­ship, however. As a NATO member with close eco­nomic ties to Europe and a constitutionally secular Muslim country with an electoral democracy and a liberal economy, the United States promoted Turkey during the 2000s as a paradigm of Islam’s compatibility with democracy and a Muslim nation’s integration into the West.⁷³ The AKP leadership happily embrac­ed such promotion.

Given its roots in Turkey’s Islamist Nationalist Out­look Movement and its founding by the movement’s self-declared moderates, the AKP’s rise to power in 2002 was a convenient coincidence at a time when Washington’s Middle East policy was shaped by the “global war on terror”.⁷⁴ During the early 2000s, the view that the Turkish model highlighting Islam’s com­patibility with democracy “would provide an alter­native path to the ‘clash of civilisations’” was popu­lar.⁷⁵ For instance, in the aftermath of the 2007 Turk­ish parliamentary elections, Nicholas Burns – then US Secretary of State – applauded Turkey as “the most impressive democracy in the Muslim world”.⁷⁶

The euphoria about Turkey as a model for an imagined Muslim world was more than mere rheto­ric. The United States played an indispensable and influential role in advocating Turkey’s EU membership, culminating in the start of the accession nego­tiations in 2005 – just as it had worked hard during the 1990s for a Customs Union Agreement between Ankara and Brussels. US advocacy was driven by a firm belief in a unipolar order sustained by economic and political liberalisation. During the first decade of the 2000s, the region’s authoritarian leaders and secu­lar and liberal circles all welcomed the AKP’s leadership, as a party with roots in political Islam. The EU accession talks added to the fervour. The belief that integrating an Islamist party, previously seen as excluded from the political system, marked “the rise of democratic society in Turkey”⁷⁷ enhanced the AKP’s image on the international stage.

Ankara’s democracy promotion agenda

The Arab uprisings marked a turning point for re­gion­al perceptions about Turkey. As far as the region’s ruling elites were concerned, Turkish support for the Mus­lim Brotherhood and other Sunni Islamists across the region challenged “the possibility of harmonising Islam, democracy, and the modern state”.⁷⁸ Their admiration for Turkey under AKP leadership swiftly gave way to mistrust and suspicion. Meanwhile, Tur­key became many things for Arab Islamists, including a democracy promoter, a spokesperson, a custodian, and even a home. Their earlier caution towards the AKP for allegedly adhering to a “Western notion of secularism”, and for its tactical alliance with Turkish secularists and liberals, its foreign policy alignment with the United States, and its emphasis on Turkey’s EU membership gradually gave way to rapport.⁷⁹

In a speech to the Turkish parliament in 2011, then Prime Minister Erdoğan noted that “stability can only be provided by systems that derive their legiti­macy from the people”, concluding that reform would have to occur across the region to meet “legiti­mate demands” of Arab citizens.⁸⁰ In June of the same year, the AKP won the parliamentary elections for the third time, gaining 49.8 per cent of the vote and a majority of seats (327). Already emboldened by the impressive growth rates (generated by financial flows following the 2008 global crisis) and by the disempowerment of the country’s traditional veto powers, the military and the judiciary, the party’s growing electoral popu­larity further boosted its leadership’s confidence.

At this juncture, amid the Arab uprisings, the so-called Turkish model enjoyed another round of popu­larity. An article in the Economist in February 2011 promoted Turkey as a “Muslim democracy in action” that should be emulated.⁸¹ Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton noted at a conference on US-Turkey relations in October of that year that the United States was aware that “Turkey has a unique opportunity in this time of great historic change … to demonstrate the power of an inclusive democracy and responsible regional leadership.”⁸²

At the onset of the Arab uprisings, when the protests first broke out in Tunisia and Egypt, the AKP elites were initially quiet. As events continued to unfold, An­kara shifted its position in favour of actors demand­ing change, albeit in a selective manner “depending on Turkish interests at stake”.⁸³ Turkey was the first NATO member to request Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to step down, calling upon him to “take the necessary steps to satisfy the Egyptian people’s demands first without providing an opportunity for those who have dark scenarios for Egypt”.⁸⁴ Similarly, after ini­tial efforts to convince Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to pursue reforms, Ankara moved to an anti-Assad position lending support to the Syrian opposition.

Ankara presented its support of political dissent as an act of virtue and principle in line with its democracy promotion agenda.

Ankara presented its support of political dissent as an act of virtue and principle. Responding to Turkish criticisms of Ankara’s anti-Assad position, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said in 2012 that “standing against the tyrant is a moral question, a matter of justice”.⁸⁵ Similarly, the then head of Turkish intel­ligence, Hakan Fidan, who currently serves as foreign minister, noted in an academic article published in 2013 that “Turkey has in recent years moved further in the direction of defending the principles of democ­racy and human rights, especially in the context of the political transformation in the Middle East and North Africa.”⁸⁶ The view that Turkey’s emphasis on popular legitimacy “underscored its Western char­acter” was not uncommon among foreign and secu­rity policy experts within Turkey.⁸⁷

The Turkish foreign policy elites’ emphasis on democracy promotion was not only discursive. The AKP leadership believed that promoting democracy in the region would serve the strategic goal of elevating Turkey to regional power status, bridging a liberated Muslim world with the West and overcoming mental barriers between Europe and the Middle East. In the summer of 2010, a new law mandated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote democracy and human rights to “help achieve Turkey’s foreign policy aims in the Middle East”.⁸⁸

Hegemonic aspirations devouring claims to popular legitimacy

In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the AKP’s grow­ing confidence, combined with an identity-based perception of the world, led Ankara to engage in a regional offensive at the risk of drifting apart not only from its Western allies but also from Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The 2013 coup against the Mohamed Mursi government in Egypt and the dec­la­ration of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist orga­nisation further exacerbated the fault lines. The second half of the 2010s witnessed intense rivalry over regional hegemony between Turkey, on the one hand, and Egypt, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other.

The media was an essential element of these rival­ries. In 2018 the Saudi satellite network MBC sus­pended Turkish soap operas to curtail Turkish influ­ence in the region; they had already been banned from Egypt’s pro-government TV channels in 2013.⁸⁹ In a similar move, Dar al-Ifta, the Egyptian authority responsible for issuing religious edicts, warned Egyp­tians against watching Turkish soap operas (on satel­lite channels).⁹⁰ In 2020 Saudi Arabia banned access to Turkey’s state-run Anadolu Agency website and its state broadcaster TRT’s Arabic service.⁹¹ Meanwhile, the UAE started promoting itself as a regional power with a “vision for a moderate, modern Muslim world”.⁹²

The conflict was conducted intensively at the geo­political level. After the UAE and Egypt opposed the Turkish military incursion into Afrin in northern Syria in 2018,⁹³ the Turkish pro-government daily Yeni Safak accused Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE of sending troops to replace American forces station­ed in northeastern Syria.⁹⁴ In 2019, Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, and Israel established the informal Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum to facilitate cooperation among suppliers, buyers, and transit countries. In 2021, Saudi Arabia and Greece held a joint training exercise at the Souda Air Force Base in Crete,⁹⁵ and signed a defence agreement.⁹⁶ The UAE and Greece also strengthened ties, signing a strategic partnership agreement in 2020 that includes defence and foreign policy cooperation.⁹⁷

From democracy promotion to leader of the ummah

Ankara’s support for Sunni Islamists continued throughout the 2010s. As noted above, Turkey had become a refuge for the region’s Islamists, many of whom viewed Erdoğan as the saviour of political Islam. Until recently, Turkey’s ruling elites were gen­erous in supporting the Sunni Islamists’ political organisations within the diaspora.⁹⁸

After the Arab uprisings, Turkey had become a refuge for the region’s Islamists.

In turn, at critical moments such as the failed coup attempt in 2016 and the 2017 constitutional refer­endum that institutionalised the presidential system, Sunni Islamists lent important support to Erdoğan and the AKP.⁹⁹ At a “Thank you, Turkey” meeting organised by Arab Islamists in Istanbul in 2016, for instance, Khalid Meshaal, the former leader of Hamas, praised Turkey for presenting “the best example of political Islam in democracy, governance, and econo­my”.¹⁰⁰ At the same meeting Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Egyptian scholar of Islam and former chairperson of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, who passed away in 2022, also expressed his gratitude to Erdoğan and Turkey for defending Islam and the causes of Arab and Muslim nations.¹⁰¹

In 2018, representatives of Arab communities in Turkey called on Arabs and Muslims within and out­side Turkey to support the Turkish economy. They asserted that the currency crisis severely affecting Turkey had been “orchestrated by external actors that were unhappy with Turkey’s rise to regional power status and with its support for the Arab uprisings”.¹⁰² Two years later, Erdoğan was celebrated at an event organised in 2020 by the Union of Arab Communities in Turkey as “the leader of the Islamic nation, who made sacrifices and stood against the forces of tyr­an­ny in the name of the 1.3 billion Muslims.”¹⁰³

Palestine and the rights of the Palestinians

Ankara’s focus on Palestine and the rights of the Pales­tinians has three components. During the 2000s, the defence of Palestinian rights was framed as part of Turkey’s democracy promotion agenda. Ankara stood by Hamas after its electoral victory in the 2006 Pales­tinian parliamentary election. This was a critical moment as Turkey “took strong exception to the West­ern position of not recognising Hamas because it did not renounce violence and did not accept Israel’s right to exist”.¹⁰⁶ The United States and the European Union consider Hamas a terrorist organisation. Ankara, in contrast, considers it “a resistance move­ment that defends the Palestinian homeland against an occupying power”.¹⁰⁷

Democracy promotion, peace-making, and the aspiration for the leadership of the ummah mark Ankara’s focus on Palestine.

Turkey was the first majority Muslim country to recognise Israel in 1949. It was also among the first to recognise the State of Palestine. Notwithstanding its close economic, diplomatic and defence relations with Israel, confrontational moments occurred even before the AKP’s rise to power.¹⁰⁸ Now, with the AKP in government, Palestine has become one of the cen­tral markers of Turkey’s self-promotion as a “peacemaker in the periphery of the international system”¹⁰⁹ – the second component of Ankara’s focus on Palestine and the rights of the Palestinians. During the fighting in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009 (Operation Cast Lead) Ankara’s ties to Hamas helped Turkey to fill “the mediation vacuum left by the EU’s and the US’ policies”¹¹⁰, albeit without concrete results.

That episode also represented a significant challenge to Turkish mediation efforts. The Israeli mili­tary incursion started only four days after Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had visited Ankara, where “a blueprint for talks with the Assad regime in Syria” was agreed upon.¹¹¹ When the fighting began, Turkey suspended its facilitating role in the talks. At the end of January 2009, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan openly confronted Israeli President Simon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos, criticising the violent aggression of the Israeli army and again posi­tioning himself and Turkey as the guardian of Pales­tinian rights. Turkish-Israeli relations soured further a year later in 2010, when Israeli commandos boarded a convoy of ships carrying aid to the Gaza Strip, in an operation that ended in the death of nine Turkish activists. A year later, Ankara expelled the Israeli ambassador and other senior diplomats over Israel’s failure to apologise for the deadly raid in 2010. Until Turkey’s rapprochement efforts began in 2022, diplo­matic relations oscillated between reconciliation attempts (such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s apology for the Gaza flotilla incident) and sporadic tensions (for example over alleged Turk­ish involvement in the exposure of Israeli agents in Iran or the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador in 2018 in protest at Israel’s killing of Palestinians demonstrating against the US recognition of Jeru­salem as the capital of Israel).

Although Ankara’s diplomatic ties with Israel deteriorated, economic relations remained constant. Meanwhile, identitarian motivations have become a more salient component of the Turkish emphasis on Palestine and the rights of the Palestinians. For Ankara, safeguarding Palestine and the rights of the Palestinians is part of its quest for justice for Muslims worldwide. According to this narrative, the liberation of the Muslims started in Turkey (thanks to Erdoğan’s leadership) and has spread to other Muslim countries. Erdoğan has promoted this rhetoric, for instance describing the conversion of the Hagia Sophia into a mosque in 2020 as the “harbinger of the Al-Aqsa Mosque’s liberation”.¹¹²

These three components were strikingly visible in Turkey’s response to the most recent episode of violence in Gaza, since October 7, 2023. In the early days of the conflict, Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan noted that Ankara considers Hamas “a part of the Palestinian state and a political party within the state system”.¹¹³ President Erdoğan also repeated Ankara’s view that Hamas was a “patriotic liberation movement fighting to protect Palestinian lands and people”.¹¹⁴ Similarly, since the early days of the latest war on Gaza, Ankara has tried to position itself as a mediator, albeit without success. Finally, Ankara’s civilisationist understanding of the conflict has also been salient. For instance, in a speech at an event in Tur­key, Erdoğan accused the West of lightly ignoring human rights because “the blood being spilt is Muslim blood”.¹¹⁵

Combatting Islamophobia

“Combatting Islamophobia” (in the West) constitutes a second talking point in Ankara’s foreign policy. The term appeared for the first time in the Turkish Par­lia­ment’s Human Rights Sub-Committee reports in the late 2000s. The report covering the period between October 2009 and October 2010 noted that “Islamophobic, xenophobic and racist tendencies influenced decision-makers” (referring to the legal debates in Europe on migration).¹¹⁶ Following the deadly attacks in Norway in June 2011 by the right-wing extremist Anders Breivik, the sub-committee decided to monitor Islamophobia in Europe and the US.¹¹⁷ These initial efforts were further expanded with the launch in January 2016 of a new group within the sub-com­mittee to systematically investigate “Islamophobia in the West”.¹¹⁸

Around the same time, the pro-government think tank SETA Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research launched its first annual European Islamophobia Report., to which internationally renowned scholars on Islamophobia contributed.¹¹⁹ SETA was conceived by former President Abdullah Gül, launched in 2005 by Ahmet Davutoğlu and is currently run by members of Erdoğan’s extended family. İbrahim Kalın, the current head of the Turk­ish National Intelligence Organisation and the former spokesperson and advisor to the Office of Presidency, served as its founding director. For Davutoğlu and Kalın, Islamophobia represents a challenge to the Muslim world and to Islam, requiring a coordinated collective response by Muslim countries.¹²⁰ In 2019, Turkey was reported to have reached a trilateral agreement with Malaysia and Pakistan to launch a TV channel to fight Islamophobia, although the project has yet to materialise.¹²¹ Still, efforts to mobilise political elites against Islamophobia continue. At the UN General Assembly in 2021 Erdoğan announced that Turkey’s state-run news agency would launch an “Islamophobia Watch” unit,¹²² and demanded that March 15 be designated the “international day to com­bat Islamophobia”.¹²³ A year later, the UN Gen­eral Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by 60 member states of the Organisation of Islamic Co­operation, designating March 15 as such.¹²⁴

Anti-colonialism

Ankara’s favourite nemesis in its campaign against Islamophobia is France. After President Macron asserted in 2020 that Islam was in crisis, İbrahim Kalın described the statement as “dangerous and pro­vocative, encouraging Islamophobia and anti-Muslim populism.”¹²⁵ Numerous articles appeared on pro-government media channels tying Islamophobia in France to the country’s colonial past and identifying it as “neo-colonialism”.¹²⁶ A critique of colonialism and its legacies has been recently added to Ankara’s talking points.

Pro-government circles see Turkey’s Muslim identity and its perceived lack of a colonial past as a foreign policy advantage.

At the height of the Eastern Mediterranean con­flict in 2020, Macron argued that the EU needed to be strict with Erdoğan. AKP spokesperson Ömer Çelik retorted: “Macron continues colonialism, while our President continues to defend the interests of the oppressed peoples, protect the peace, and frustrate the colonialists’ games.”¹²⁷ In the wake of the 2023 coup d’état in Niger, Erdoğan accused France of “years of oppression against Africans”. “All France’s activ­ities in Algeria, Mali and Rwanda recorded. Africans know them all well. They suspended gold and uranium exports to France. This is a response to French oppres­sion in the continent. We will continue to develop our positive relations with Africans.”¹²⁸ Government officials and pro-government commentators see Turkey’s Muslim identity and its perceived lack of a colonial past (attributing colonialism only to Western empires) as a foreign policy advantage over Western states (particularly in Syria and Africa).¹²⁹

Critique of the international order

Ankara’s critique of Western colonialism is often intertwined with its fourth talking point on the perceived inequalities of the international order, famously encapsulated as “the world is bigger than five”. The slogan was first coined by Erdoğan in 2013 at the opening event of the “Asia Pacific Retail Con­ference and Fair”, referring to the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Since then, it has become integral to Turkish foreign policy rhetoric. Erdoğan brought it up in 2014 at the UN General Assembly, accusing the West of double standards and noting that “that double standard leads to significant and serious mistrust, in­cluding towards the United Nations; it harms a sense of justice and leads millions of people to despair.”¹³⁰

Erdoğan’s speeches on the topic between 2014 and 2016 were collated and published by the Directorate of Communications as a book in 2017.¹³¹ At a meet­ing organised the same year by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, Erdoğan repeated his criticism that the UNSC lacked a Muslim country among its permanent members. The book was later translated into English and Arabic, and in 2018 material was integrated into a 12th-grade textbook on Turkish history.¹³² In 2021, Erdoğan published a second book entitled “A more just world is possible”, continuing his criticism of the international order.¹³³

In his speech at the 2023 annual meeting of Turkish ambassadors, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan referred to these two slogans – “the world is bigger than five” and “a more just world is possible” – as essential pillars of Turkish foreign policy. He added that Turkey believes that the Bretton Woods institutions need to be reformed if they are to function effec­tively.¹³⁴ Addressing the UNSC on 24 January 2024, Fidan similarly noted that “the continuation of the current situation in Gaza will further undermine the fundamental principles and moral values of the international system.”¹³⁵ Despite the agreement of “most of the members of the international community on the urgency of a cease-fire, humanitarian assis­tance, and the two-state solution”, he added, an “effec­tive mechanism for getting Israel to implement it” was lacking.

Counter-Hegemonic Struggles¹³⁶

These talking points are circulated via government officials’ speeches, pro-government think tanks, research centres, universities and state media chan­nels such as Anadolu Agency and the TRT (which broad­cast in Arabic and other languages).¹³⁷ Ankara’s (selec­tive) defence¹³⁸ of the marginalised and disenfranchis­ed worldwide is based on a perception that “a (post­colonial) new subjectivity is being created through ‘new Turkey’”.¹³⁹ The term “new Turkey” was coined by Erdoğan in 2014 after his election to the presidency, and refers to the aspiration to engage in a new nation-building project that is “post-Kemalist with its aim of democratisation”, “post-Western with its aim of independence”, and “post-Westphalian with its aim of a new political unit and institutionalisation”.¹⁴⁰

For the AKP leadership the empowerment of Turkey’s so-called underrepresented citizens through Erdoğan’s consolidation of power is nothing less than a prelude to the liberation of disenfranchised com­munities – first and foremost, Muslims around the world. Speaking at the annual TRT World Forum in 2018, İbrahim Kalın applauded “the resilience of people of the Muslim World” (in comparison to the nihilism of the West despite its political stability, economic privileges and development) and noted that “political leadership, wisdom, and determination” were necessary “to realise their dreams”.¹⁴¹ Erdoğan’s son-in-law Selçuk Bayraktar, whose family’s company is known for the famous Turkish military drones, similarly noted that the family business aims at “giving the youth self-confidence that we’ve [Turkey] lacked for centuries” (as the centre of gravity shifted to the West).¹⁴²

Ankara propagates its outspoken criticism of Western domination as evidence of Turkey’s international standing.

According to İbrahim Kalın, Ankara’s criticism of Western hegemony is not a call to “replace it with a new Russian- or Chinese-centric framework”, but to “establish a new order that treats every nation as an equal, in which every country feels safe”.¹⁴³ Ankara sees (and propagates) its outspoken criticism of Western domination and international inequalities as evidence of Turkey’s international standing. The message to the masses inside and outside Turkey is clear: Under the AKP, Turkey has acquired capabilities that enable it to play hardball with global powers.

Polarised societies

Polarisation cuts through the region. The wide gulf between ruling elites and the wider population initially played into the AKP leadership’s hands, espe­cially during and after the Arab uprisings. However, the same polarisation also harmed Turkey’s ambitions for regional influence. For one, Ankara’s close ties with the Sunni Islamists antagonised many non-Islamist actors. To cite the former Egyptian Ambassador to Ankara, Abdurrahman Salahaddin:¹⁴⁴ “We admired Turkey until 2012. Egyptians admired the secular, modern Turkey with a rising economy and strong aspirations to become an EU member. They admired the economic governance in Turkey by com­petent names such as Kemal Derviş. We also admired the respect that a conservative political party like the AKP had for the secular constitution of the Turkish state.”¹⁴⁵

Over time, what arguably started as a “maximum benefit-minimum cost”¹⁴⁶ calculation – when the AKP leadership decided to back the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (and elsewhere) – turned into a low gain-high loss adventure. Trapped in the mismatch between its ambitions and capabilities, Turkey’s relations with its Western allies soured. It was also caught in a fierce rivalry with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as mentioned above.¹⁴⁷

Negative repercussions of these growing tensions appeared in the economy, hurting Turkish interests.

Negative repercussions of these growing tensions appeared in the economy, hurting Turkish interests. Although economic relations between Ankara and Arab countries did not cease amid the geopolitical rivalry ushered in by the Arab uprisings, Ankara’s trade with the region peaked in 2012, but would have likely continued to grow if Ankara had not found itself regionally isolated. Tunisia is a good example. Following the success of secular parties in the 2014 elections, Turkey’s trade volume with Tunisia fell below the figure for 2013 (US$1.03 billion) and re­mained largely stable until 2021 (US$1.37 billion), when it started to rise again against the backdrop of regional rapprochement efforts.¹⁴⁸ Popular support for economic relations with Turkey also declined by 14 percentage points between 2013 and 2021, while support for better economic relations with Saudi Arabia increased from 47 per cent to 61 per cent during the same period.¹⁴⁹

The region’s economic and political elites also fear Turkey swamping their markets. After concerns about its growing current account deficit with Turkey, for instance, Tunisia imposed new customs duties on Turkish products in 2018.¹⁵⁰ Two years later, Morocco similarly asked a Turkish retail company to increase the proportion of local goods it sells to at least half.¹⁵¹ Turkey’s trade surplus became a cause for concern among Morocco’s ruling elites and business community, culminating in a revision of the FTA the two coun­tries signed in 2004.¹⁵² Under this, Morocco imposed a “90% additional customs duty on 1,200 Turkish products in 150 different industrial, food, and textile categories for five years”.¹⁵³ Also in 2018, Saudi Arabia’s non-governmental Chambers of Com­merce called for a boycott of Turkish products.¹⁵⁴

Waning support for the Islamists

Erdoğan’s (and Turkey’s) appeal to many Arab Islam­ists was driven as much by ideology as by interests. For many, Turkey was a balancing force against the region’s authoritarian elites, which regard political Islam as a threat to their survival. Ankara’s increasingly confrontational foreign policy and expanding military footprint since 2016 have contributed to this view, which seems to be shared by the region’s ruling elites. According to Danforth and Stein, the view of Turkey as “a strong and serious country capable of causing a lot of problems for rivals if it wanted to” was influential in the rapprochement efforts between Turkey and Egypt since 2020/21.¹⁵⁵

Since 2020, Turkey has been on a charm offensive to break nearly a decade of regional isolation. This shift in policy towards Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE was forced by a combination of factors, including Ankara’s economic woes, US President Joseph Biden’s election, the geopolitical realignment in the region following the Abraham Accords, the Syrian government’s rapprochement with regional governments, and the mending of ties between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates with Qatar. Ankara had also grown wary of the increasing cooperation between Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Israel, and the Arab states in the eastern Mediterranean. The temporal overlap with the divergence of interests among Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, as well as the decreasing trust in the continued US involvement in the region, encouraged Turkey’s rapprochement efforts.¹⁵⁶

Ankara has recently been more cautious and distanced itself from Arab Islamists.

In order to mend its strained relations with its Sunni rivals at a time of economic woes and financial needs, Ankara has recently been more cautious and distanced itself from Arab Islamists. It asked the Mus­lim Brotherhood–affiliated media channels in Tur­key to tone down their criticism. In 2022 an Islamist satellite TV channel based in Istanbul – Mekameleen – announced that it was ceasing broadcasting and closing its eight studios.¹⁵⁷ Ankara reportedly also asked Brotherhood members to leave.¹⁵⁸ In a similar move in April 2022, a Turkish court transferred the trial of the alleged murderers of Saudi dissident Jamal Khashoggi to Saudi Arabia. Ankara has also recently arrested Tunisian Ennahda leaders at the request of President Saied. Last, but not least, despite the dis­satis­faction of actors within the Syrian opposition, Turkey has also tried to mend ties with Bashar al-Assad, albeit with no concrete outcome. These moves – motivated by Ankara’s shifting foreign policy prior­ities – have weakened its reputation as an actor with disruption capacity and damaged its credibility.

These moves have so far not led to open criticism against Turkey among Sunni Islamists, however. Islamist exiles have limited range of alternative bases and the Muslim Brotherhood is in retreat amid inter­nal struggles and divisions.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, despite its increasing caution, the AKP leadership appears not to have completely turned its back on the Islamists. In early August 2023 for instance, Erdoğan received a delegation from the International Union of Muslim Scholars.¹⁶⁰ A month earlier he had hosted Ismail Haniyeh, the Head of the Hamas Political Bureau (and Mahmoud Abbas, the leader of the Palestinian National Authority).¹⁶¹ Turkey continues to support and cooperate with Sunni groups in Northern Syria.

Turkey’s autocratic turn and the regime’s survival

There is also an increasing awareness – among Islamists and non-Islamists alike – that Turkey has turned into an autocracy and that Erdoğan resembles the region’s other leaders. Instead of Turkey leading the region – as once assumed and hoped by various actors for different reasons – the AKP leadership seems to have integrated Turkey into a region shaped by growing authoritarian consolidation and fierce transactionalism.

In this respect discontent about tensions among Turkey’s Islamists themselves, such as Erdoğan’s fall-out with Gülenists, and later, with figures such as Ahmet Davutoğlu is noteworthy. Arab Islamists are aware that Ankara’s support was neither solely a matter of ideology nor of foreign policy interests. In the eyes of many, domestic politics and particularly the AKP leadership’s survival struggles were also in­fluential. For instance, the perception that Erdoğan’s fear of a military coup was behind Turkey’s reaction to Sisi’s takeover in Egypt is not uncommon.

Indeed, 2013 marks a crucial year in the unfolding of Turkish authoritarianism. Erdoğan’s informal alliance with the Gülenists ended, and the AKP gov­ern­ment was taken aback by mass demonstrations – the largest against Erdoğan’s rule – against plans to replace Taksim Gezi Park with a shopping mall. Around 2.5 million citizens joined demonstrations across the country, 4,900 were taken into custody and approximately 4,000 were injured.¹⁶² In 2019, six years after the demonstrations, an Istanbul court put Osman Kavala, a prominent Turkish philanthropist and businessman, on trial along with fifteen others on charges of “attempting to overthrow the Turkish government by force”.¹⁶³ Depicted by the AKP leader­ship as “an insurrection”,¹⁶⁴ the protests were also included in the 12th-grade history textbook in 2018 as examples of “uprisings against democracy” with “significant economic repercussions.”¹⁶⁵

Increasing xenophobia within Turkish society

Suspicion and discontent about Turkey and its re­gional policies go beyond the region’s elites – Islam­ists and non-Islamists alike. Rising anti-refugee and anti-Arab sentiments within Turkish society taint the image that Ankara wants to portray. The question of Syrian refugees was one of the most contested topics in the run-up to the 2023 parliamentary and presi­dential elections and even more so between the two rounds of the presidential elections.

Verbal and physical attacks against refugees and other Arabs are not uncommon.

Verbal and physical attacks against refugees and other Arabs are not uncommon. In September 2023, for instance, a Kuwaiti tourist was beaten unconscious in the Black Sea city of Trabzon, causing out­rage across the Arab world as the video of the inci­dent circulated.¹⁶⁶ A Syrian refugee was shot dead the previous year outside his home in Istanbul.¹⁶⁷ Refugee children are reported to face ill-treatment by teachers or classmates at schools.¹⁶⁸ Syrian women find them­selves facing sexual harassment and even violence.¹⁶⁹

The war on Gaza: Turkey’s regional influence waning?¹⁷⁵

The most recent episode of violent conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza illustrates Turkey’s fragile influence. The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the crucial talking points of Turkish foreign policy, as already mentioned. Positioning itself as the defender of Palestinians has helped Turkey gain sympathy among Arab citizens. Yet after almost two decades of seeking to expand Turkey’s role in the Middle East, Ankara has been a marginal actor in the latest esca­lation. Despite Ankara’s initial mediation efforts, Qatar became the decisive actor in hostage negotiations and ceasefire agreements, and Egypt leads the talks over border openings.

Not only did Ankara’s relations with Hamas appear to be of little value, but Ankara also lacked influence on Israel. In an expert survey recently conducted by ISPI, Turkey was listed among the countries that have played a “somewhat negative” role in “defusing ten­sions or bringing the two parties to the table”.¹⁷⁶ The Turkish foreign minister’s proposal in the early days of the war for a guarantee system involving inter­national forces and regional actors has received little attention. Turkey has largely aligned itself with Egypt and the Gulf states.¹⁷⁷

Lacking decisive influence on the region’s elites, Islamists and non-Islamists alike, and constrained by its economic woes, Turkey is arguably left with largely rhetorical instruments. Ankara has starkly criticised Israel’s disproportionate and indiscriminate response to Hamas’ gruesome attacks since the early days of the conflict – yet maintained economic rela­tions with Israel throughout.¹⁷⁸ Turkey also criticised the European Union and the United States for their hypocritical stance in giving unequivocal support to Israel. Ankara’s accusation of double standards has long been accompanied by criticism of the unfairness of the international system. On 9 December 2023, after the United States vetoed a UN resolution for an immediate ceasefire, Erdoğan reiterated his call to reform the UNSC, which, he said, “has turned into a protector of Israel”.¹⁷⁹ In the same speech, Erdoğan also criticised the West for “turning a blind eye to cultural racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia” and noted that “the terms’ terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ have been turned into a guise for attacking Islam, demean­ing Muslims, and massacring the innocent”.

Recommendations

Turkey’s rhetoric appears to have mixed appeal in the region. According to a survey conducted by the Arab Barometer in Tunisia before and after the Hamas attacks, views of Turkey remained largely positive and unchanged even though approval of Erdoğan’s for­eign policy declined from 54 per cent to 47 per cent after the October 7 attacks.¹⁸⁰ In an Arab Opinion Poll conducted in sixteen Arab countries between Decem­ber 2023 and January 2024, 47 per cent of respondents evaluated the Turkish position positively, while 40 per cent evaluated it negatively.¹⁸¹ In contrast, an overwhelming majority of respondents have a nega­tive view of the positions of Germany (75 per cent), France (79 per cent), and the United States (94 per cent).¹⁸²

Ankara seeks to instrumentalise the growing dis­content with American and European policies in the region by systematically emphasising the inter­national order’s weaknesses and the perceived double standards of Western states. The same narrative also brands the Western states – as do Russia and China – as “the culprits of the erosion of a cooperative inter­national order and a lack of effort to ensure more mutually beneficial outcomes.”¹⁸³ Disenchantment in the region with Western states predates the most recent violence in Gaza of course, and has been strong since the American invasion of Iraq.¹⁸⁴ Mean­while, Arab citizens tend to view the EU’s policies as motivated by self-interests, despite the EU being one of the most important donors in the region.¹⁸⁵ The EU’s perceived lack of a strategic approach to the region risks weakening its credibility.¹⁸⁶ Indeed, the member states’ “divided and undecided”¹⁸⁷ response to the war on Gaza further accentuates this view.¹⁸⁸

In order to reduce the reputational costs, it is inflicting on itself and prevent the battle of narratives undermining its already fragile soft power, the EU should communicate to the region’s citizens and elites its consistent and non-selective commitment to international law.

It is clear that Brussels and Ankara are not always on the same page regarding their goals, interests and threat perceptions in the MENA region. Yet cooperation is inevitable given the various challenges, notably the transition to a green economy and migration. The EU should support Turkey’s regional rapprochement efforts, especially when they align with the EU’s own interests. Alongside North Africa, the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean, particularly Egypt and Tur­key, display colossal potential to produce green hydro­gen for export to Europe. The region might also serve as an additional natural gas supplier during the transitional period.¹⁸⁹ Turkey’s rapprochement with Egypt (and the Gulf states) might contribute positively to the EU’s green energy ambitions.

Migration is another central area of ongoing co­opera­tion between Turkey and the EU. The EU should not turn a blind eye to the mounting anti-refugee sentiments within Turkish society. Such growing dis­content increases the pressure on Ankara concerning the integration of primarily Syrian refugees. To bear fruit in the long run, any EU-Turkey migration co­operation needs to account for the negative mood. After all, neither the advancement of the rights of refugees in Turkey nor reliable security cooperation is possible without the support of the Turkish political class and society. To this end, the EU should signal its intention to proactively support local integration efforts in Turkey.¹⁹⁰