One effect of the Soviet Union’s implosion was the re-emergence of three independent South Caucasus states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. This immediately affected the foreign policy postures of neighbouring Turkey and Russia (not to mention Iran), the EU and its member states, and the United States.

Since the turn of the millennium, Turkey has sought to increase its regional footprint by taking bilateral steps, with varying degrees of success; proposing and promoting regional initiatives, including the “Stability Pact for the Caucasus” in January 2000, the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform” in August 2008, and the “3+3” format in December 2020; and, most recently, signalling interest in participating directly in the ongoing Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process. 

For the EU, Turkey is still a formal candidate for accession, albeit a dormant one. It is also a major economic, trade, connectivity, security, and migration policy partner. Although Ankara’s strategic role in the South Caucasus and elsewhere is acknowledged by the EU and appreciated by some of its member states, Turkey is increasingly being viewed as a challenge – a competitor and even a rival – in the context of the EU’s drive to become a stronger geopolitical actor. 

Against this background, this project aims to assess how Turkey’s engagement in the South Caucasus is perceived in some EU member states and other major power centres, to identify areas of cooperation and divergence, and to evaluate the implications of the foregoing for the EU. To that end, the distinct postures and interests of the following actors are examined: Turkey, the EU itself, three EU member states (France, Germany, and Hungary), and two outside powers (Russia and the US).