The global and regional drivers of reconciliation

Changes in American policies have been one of the important drivers of reconciliation in the Middle East and have influenced regional efforts in different ways. Firstly, there was significant downsizing by the United States in the region, or at least a perception of downsizing, in particular affecting Gulf countries reliant on US security guarantees. Although there has been an ongoing American desire ever since the era of President Barack Obama to scale back its security commitments to the Middle East in order to concentrate more on its emerging rivalry with China, the process was rapidly increased by the Trump and Biden administrations. The first clear manifestation of America’s withdrawing was Washington’s lack of response to the drone and missile attacks in September 2019 on the Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq.¹ This tendency was accelerated by the Biden administration. America’s rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2021 certainly did not go unnoticed in the Gulf.²

Moreover, the Biden administration’s desire to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and its emphasis on democracy and human rights marked a departure from the Trump era, prompting Middle Eastern states, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to recalibrate their regional foreign policies. The combination of America’s withdrawing, the pros­pects for a revival of the JCPOA, and Biden’s policy shift encouraged Middle Eastern states to reduce their reliance on the United States, triggering a region-wide realignment.

Although American policy towards the Middle East was the main external driver of reconciliation efforts in the region, there were regional developments that also pushed for the normalisation of relations.

The Arab Spring fallout led to a regional power struggle, with Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia vying for dominance. Turkey’s attempts at regime change and to install allies in Syria and Egypt failed, Iran faced limitations in its efforts to expand beyond the “Shiite ghetto”,³ and Saudi Arabia’s assertiveness reached its limits, notably in Yemen and Qatar. The three powers could not establish regional dominance, thereby creating a stalemate in which none could stabilise a political system, yet all were capable of disrupting each other’s designs.

In the same line, military conflicts either produced a significant victor, as seen with Iran’s success in Syria, or resulted in a stalemate, as with the situation in Libya, where Turkey, Egypt, and the UAE were un­able to push forward their interests. The diminishing returns of military actions prompted a shift towards diplomatic solutions. The economic burdens of con­flicts, exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, also ex­hausted major actors and led to the prioritisation of diplomacy.

Another dimension of the exhaustion was on the ideological front. As the counter-revolutionary forces supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE managed to stop and/or expel the Islamists from power in every country, the ideological struggles started to take a back seat. Islamists not only lost the power struggles, but their general appeal had significantly diminished due to a decade of consistent failures and widespread discretisation.⁴ As Islamists lost their momentum, the conservative and counter-revolutionary forces in the region, led by the Saudi-UAE bloc, took a less alarmist approach and opened new diplomatic channels with Turkey and Qatar.

Against this background, the countries in the region began to act with more pragmatism and prioritised economics, trade, and diplomatic relations over for­eign policy rivalries, ideological competition, and military activism.

Turkey-specific drivers

With regard to Turkey-specific drivers of reconciliation, the economy ranks first. Since 2018, Turkey has faced severe economic difficulties marked by a soar­ing exchange rate and high inflation. The economic downturn led to political consequences, with the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) losing key cities in the 2019 local elections and having to face declining polling numbers ahead of the 2023 general elections. To boost his domestic popularity, President Erdoğan shifted economic policy towards growth, relying on low-interest rates and cheap credit. While this stimulated short-term growth and prevented a spike in unemployment, it required Central Bank reserves to stabilise the currency – an unsustainable strategy. Combined with Turkey’s chronic current account deficit, this approach risks creating a cash crisis without there being significant international borrowing.⁵ Turkey aimed to strengthen ties with Gulf countries in anticipation of them providing sources of credit and investment in addition to serving as markets for Turkish products.

Moreover, it became clear that a confrontational, militaristic foreign policy diminished Turkey’s appeal as a stable investment destination. Military operations in the Middle East strained the state budget, while hos­tile relations with countries in the region hurt Turkey’s tourism and trade prospects.⁶

Turkey’s reconciliation efforts are driven by economic difficulties and regional isolation.

Reconciliation efforts also have an important geo­political dimension. Turkey’s assertive foreign policy has resulted in growing international isolation, particu­larly within the Arab world, with Qatar stand­ing as its sole state-level ally. This isolation has extended to countries in the eastern Mediterranean as well and fostered an anti-Turkish alliance comprised of Greece and Cyprus – long-standing rivals – while including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. Turkey’s iso­lation in the eastern Mediterranean is best observed in the attempts to manage the large natural gas resources discovered in the region. In 2020, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) was established by the littoral states and France and Italy, which have major companies in the natural gas sector (Total and ENI, respectively). Despite having the longest coast­line, Turkey was excluded from the EMGF, leading Turkey to view the organisation as a particularly anti-Turkey alliance. The Al-Ula agreement, which was intended to ease tensions with the Arab Quartet (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain), incentivised Turkey to improve relations with Middle Eastern coun­tries in order to strategically weaken the alli­ances between these nations and Greece and Cyprus.⁷

Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy – including military interventions in Syria, Libya, Iraq, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – reached its limits. Although successful militarily, there are reports of over­extension, which has impacted Turkey’s ability to respond to crises, such as the 2023 earthquakes.⁸

Growing tensions with Iran – exacerbated by regional conflicts and divergent interests – has made Turkey an appealing ally for anti-Iranian countries.⁹ Perceptions about America’s withdrawing from the region has increased Turkey’s value as a potential counterbalance to Iran’s ambitions.

The isolation resulting from Turkey’s foreign policy extended beyond its region, straining relations with Western allies. Regional reconciliation was part of the effort to mend ties with the West.¹⁰ Accordingly, reconciliation with regional actors could signal more pragmatism and less conflict to Western actors. Erdo­ğan also sought interlocutors in Washington, and Israel and the UAE emerged as potential partners. Ironically, the rise of anti-Western Eurasianists¹¹ in Turkey’s ruling coalition, especially after the failed coup of 2016, also fuelled reconciliation efforts. These Eurasianists – advocates of the “Blue Homeland Doctrine” – were key figures in Turkey’s expansion­ist maritime policies and prioritised mending ties with Israel and Egypt to weaken their alliances with Greece and Cyprus.

Détente with Syria

Of all the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey has the worst and most conflictual relationship with Syria. With the onset of the Arab uprisings in Syria, Turkey, after a brief hesitation, strongly sided with the oppo­sition and engaged in a proxy war ostensibly aimed at toppling the Assad regime. Moreover, Turkey has conducted four military operations in Syria since 2016 and occupies a significant part of northern Syrian territory.¹² Whereas the first three operations targeted forces of the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), thereby avoiding direct conflict with Syrian forces, the fourth aimed at stopping Syria’s advance into Idlib, leading to a direct clash.¹³ A Syrian air­strike, backed by Russia, killed 33 Turkish soldiers, prompting Turkish retaliation. Given this backdrop, reconciliation with Syria started the latest and has progressed the slowest.

This whole process was made possible mainly thanks to a radical change in Turkey’s Syria policy dating back to 2016. Turkey’s priorities in Syria changed after Aleppo fell to the regime forces. Despite its rhetorical insistence that Bashar al-Assad must step down, Turkey has de facto abandoned its policy of regime change in Syria since then. Instead, Turkey has prioritised preventing the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish political region adjacent to its territory, stopping new waves of migration into Turkey, and possibly returning some Syrian refugees in Turkey. In fact, all four of Turkey’s military opera­tions since 2016 have pursued one of these two objec­tives rather than regime change or weakening the Assad regime.

As Turkey began to restructure its relations with other regional rivals, reconciliation with Syria emerged as a possibility, as it would formalise Tur­key’s new policy paradigm, which does not prioritise the question concerning the future of the Syrian regime. For the Syrian regime, it would be an impor­tant step in breaking its international isolation and seal its victory in the Syrian civil war, as Turkey is the main supporter of the Syrian opposition.

After contact was made at the intelligence level, the Turkish and Syrian defence ministers met in Moscow on 28 December 2022.¹⁴ This was the first ministerial-level meeting between the two countries since the severing of relations in 2011. Following this meeting, Erdoğan expressed his desire to eventually meet Syrian President Assad.

In fact, Erdoğan had been pushing for a quick nor­malisation of relations with the Assad regime ahead of the May 2023 elections, aiming to score a domestic political win by addressing Turkey’s refugee crisis. By meeting with Assad before the elections, Erdoğan sought to preempt the opposition’s long-standing proposal for reconciliation with the Syrian regime by claiming he had already fulfilled what they were promising.¹⁵

However, Assad, sensing Erdoğan’s domestic politi­cal priorities, did not give Erdoğan what he wanted, despite pressure from Russia to mediate and organise a bilateral meeting at the presidential level. Instead, after several postponements and cancellations, a meet­ing of foreign ministers was held on 10 May with the participation of the Russian and Iranian foreign ministers.¹⁶

Moreover, Assad proved to be right in sensing that Erdoğan’s insistence on bilateral talks was motivated by his electoral politics. The day after Erdoğan’s elec­tion victory, Erdoğan’s spokesman, Ibrahim Kalın, announced that such a meeting was not expected any time soon.¹⁷ Indeed, Erdoğan did not raise this issue for more than a year. However, under pressure from growing public discontent over the refugees, Erdoğan once again expressed his desire to meet with Assad and achieve a full normalisation of relations with Syria in June and July 2024. However, his repeated appeals to Assad, including reminding him of their family holidays in the past, have so far failed to con­vince Assad to meet with him.¹⁸ Even if the two leaders come together at some point, Turkey’s recon­ciliation with Syria is unlikely to reach the level of a full normalisation of relations in the foreseeable future.

The biggest obstacle to reconciliation with Syria is the irreconcilability of the priorities and demands of both countries.

The main obstacle to the progress of reconciliation is the complexity – and even irreconcilability – of the priorities and demands of both countries. Syria has two preconditions for reconciliation: Turkey’s ter­mination of its military and political support for the Syrian opposition, and the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syrian territory. Meeting these demands would mean a complete capitulation for Turkey. More­over, although much of the public discussion about reconciliation in Turkey has centred on solving the refugee problem, it is not clear how reconciliation would help Turkey to do so. First, the Assad regime’s willingness to readmit Syrian refugees remains un­certain. Second, an important condition for reconcilia­tion with Turkey is to stop harbouring jihadists in Idlib. If the Syrian regime regains control of Idlib, Tur­key could face a new wave of migration. Recon­ciliation with Syria could therefore increase Turkey’s refugee burden rather than alleviate it. Thus, repat­ri­ating Syrian refugees to Turkish-occupied territories – although a highly ambitious project – seems to be the only practical way to reduce the number of refu­gees in Turkey. Such an approach also allows Turkey to demographically penetrate Kurdish-majority areas, helping to undermine Kurdish political autonomy in northern Syria. However, this may further entrench Turkey’s presence in Syria and weaken the possibility of reconciliation with the Syrian regime.

In fact, Turkey is not only attempting to keep cer­tain areas under occupation to pursue its policy of demographic engineering, but also seeking to con­tinu­ously expand its territorial control along the Turk­­ish-Syrian border. Therefore, the fact that Turkey – as the initiator of the reconciliation process – is not ruling out the possibility of a fifth military opera­tion raises serious doubts about the sustainability of the reconciliation efforts.¹⁹

This long-term structural mismatch in both countries’ approaches to reconciliation is exacerbated by the absence of short-term expectations. With the elec­toral period behind Erdoğan and Assad beginning to break his diplomatic isolation, both leaders have less incentive to push reconciliation forward.

However, the above-mentioned problems do not mean that the prospects for reconciliation have com­pletely disappeared, as cooperation on the Kurdish issue may continue to drive reconciliation efforts for­ward. Turkey’s position on the Kurdish issue is highly unlikely to change without a change in domestic power dynamics. In this context, the weakening and eventual elimination of Kurdish political autonomy in Syria remains a strategic priority for Turkey.²⁰

Although Turkey has sought to achieve this goal unilaterally, Ankara may prefer coordinated action with the Syrian regime as a more effective approach. It is important to note that, for the Turkish government, the Syrian Kurds pose a political threat rather than a territorial or military threat.²¹ Consequently, Western recognition of Syrian Kurdish-Arab forma­tions or any agreement between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) and the Syrian regime to formalise the AANES would be a serious setback for Turkey. In turn, Turkey can hope to weaken the AANES by normalising relations with the Assad regime and recognising the regime’s sov­ereignty over territories controlled by Kurdish forces. Thus, the reconciliation between Turkey and Syria could turn into an anti-Kurdish alliance, even before the current tensions are resolved and relations between Ankara and Damascus are normalised.²² In fact, even the prospect of a normalisation of relations between the two countries has shifted the balance of power in favour of the regime against the AANES. Gradual improvements in Turkish-Syrian relations could empower Damascus to adopt a more assertive stance against the Kurds in Syria. While the credibil­ity of the American protective umbrella is being ques­tioned, the Kurdish position is becoming increasingly precarious as voices within the United States in favour of withdrawal are rising.²³

Consequently, in the short term, the reconciliation process will advance only along the lines of an anti-Kurdish alliance. However, this will create more chal­lenges for the West, and in particular the United States. Further reconciliation would also lead Turkey and Syria to coordinate and cooperate against the American presence in Syria. It remains unknown as to how the United States and Europe will approach the Syria question.

Normalisation of relations with Egypt

The first visible outcome of the reconciliation at­tempts was with Egypt, with which Turkey has not had official relations since the Egyptian military coup in 2013. At the outset, the conflict between Turkey and Egypt was an ideological one. The Egyptian mili­tary overthrew the elected Muslim Brotherhood (MB) government led by President Mohamed Morsi, with whom Erdoğan not only had very cordial relations but also shared a common ideology. Over the years, Erdoğan has never recognised the legitimacy of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the former Minister of Defence who later became president of Egypt. Erdoğan has repeat­edly labelled Sisi a “putschist”, “dictator”, and “murderer” and said he would never meet with him²⁴ or sit at the same table.²⁵

But the conflict has never been purely ideological. The overthrow of the MB government in Egypt – Tur­key’s most important regional ally – was the biggest blow to Turkey’s bid for regional hegemony. Erdoğan has also used Turkish-Egyptian tensions to consolidate his domestic political base. Verbal attacks against Egypt’s then-new president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, became one of his favourite talking points, drawing parallels between the Turkish opposition and the Egyptian president, implying that both were pawns in a global conspiracy against Muslim political move­ments.²⁶

As bilateral relations completely collapsed, Turkey’s support for members of the MB and its military presence in Libya became the main topics of dis­cus­sion on the Egyptian side, while Turkey was concern­ed about its exclusion from the EMGF organised in Cairo.

Although none of these issues have been resolved, a process of reconciliation between the two states began in early 2021 in the context of the region-wide reconciliation discussed earlier. Following contact made behind-the-scenes between diplomatic and intel­ligence personnel, the first official bilateral meet­ing in years took place in Cairo in May 2021. Despite this early development, reconciliation efforts stalled for a while. In order to persuade the Egyptian lead­er­ship to continue the reconciliation process, Turkey pressured the Istanbul-based Egyptian media to soften their criticism of the Sisi regime and even stop their news coverage altogether. These gestures helped revive the process, culminating in April 2022 with Turkey appointing an ambassador to the charge d’affaires position in Cairo and, in June 2022, the first visit by a Turkish minister to Egypt in nine years.²⁷

All these developments paved the way for the two leaders to meet on 20 November 2022 with the mediation of the Emir of Qatar, Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. Despite the leaders’ meeting and the subsequent meetings and bilateral visits of the foreign ministers, the full normalisation of diplomatic relations took almost another year, up to July 2023. It was clear that the Egyptian side was waiting for the outcome of the Turkish elections.²⁸

Egypt and Turkey have achieved full diplomatic normalisation, but disagreements over Libya and eastern Mediterranean persist.

The normalisation of diplomatic relations does not mean that all the problems in their bilateral relations have been resolved. In his support for the MB, Erdo­ğan has shown that his pragmatism outweighs his ideological convictions. Moreover, this pragmatism was necessary not only to reconcile with Egypt, but also to improve the much more strategically impor­tant relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. There­fore, it can be stated that different approaches towards the MB are no longer a major obstacle to Turkish-Egyptian reconciliation. However, different perspectives on issues concerning the eastern Medi­terranean and Libya remain unresolved. In fact, the two-year-long reconciliation process has been full of pauses and reversals, mostly due to disagreements over Libyan policy.²⁹

Even after the full normalisation of relations between Turkey and Egypt, Libya remains the main obstacle, and the future of bilateral relations will largely be shaped by developments in Libya. Turkey regards the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity as the legitimate government of Libya, whereas Egypt regards the Tobruk-based House of Representatives as the only legitimate legislative body in Libya and recognises the House-appointed government of Fathi Bashagha as the legitimate government. How­ever, both countries have started to realise the limits of their policies in Libya. Turkey and its allies on the ground had to respect Egypt’s red line and did not cross the Sirte–Jufra line.³⁰ Over time, Turkey started to reach out to the forces in the east. Similarly, Egypt, realising the balance of power on the ground, started to reach out to the Tripoli government. While main­taining their initial positions, both countries realised their common stake in the stabilisation of Libya and the end of the armed conflict. The easing of tensions in Libya has been an important factor contributing to the normalisation of relations.

Although Turkish-Egyptian tensions in Libya are currently frozen, a negotiated settlement seems un­likely anytime soon. First of all, Libyan domestic politics do not have the same importance for the two countries. Egypt sees Libya as the primary national security issue, while for Turkey Libya is more a deriva­tive of its eastern Mediterranean policy. More­over, even if Turkey were to meet some of Egypt’s demands, such as the removal of Syrian fighters from Libya, it would do so in return for a change in Egypt’s policy towards Greece and the eastern Mediterranean. This interconnectedness of different conflict areas makes a negotiated settlement even more unlikely and has led to the continuation of the status quo based on frozen conflicts.³¹

Another factor preventing relations from develop­ing beyond normalisation is the economic aspect. Unlike the Gulf countries, Egypt cannot make a sig­nificant contribution towards Turkey’s economy. Moreover, even when both countries severed diplo­matic relations, they managed to compartmentalise their relations in economic terms.³² Now they are also compartmentalising political issues and trying to maintain a dialogue and diplomatic relations while continuing to disagree on critical issues.

Potential realignment with the UAE

Differences with the UAE (and Saudi Arabia) started with their support for the military coup in Egypt and then continued due to other regional conflicts. Most notably in the Libyan civil war, Egypt and the UAE engaged in a proxy war against Turkey and supported rival factions. Turkey read the Arab uprisings as a seizure of power by the authentic peoples of the Middle East, while the counter-revolutionaries were characterised as inauthentic lackeys of the West. Qatar was Turkey’s main ally in supporting the Arab uprisings and became the target of the blockade imposed by the Arab Quartet (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain) in 2017. Viewing this as an attempt to undermine its regional role, Turkey sided firmly with Qatar, dispatching troops and providing aid to counter the embargo, thereby deepening already existing tensions with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Having recognised Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ) as the mastermind behind the counter-revo­lutionary wave in the region, Turkey soon declared the UAE as the main enemy. Turkey’s accusations against the UAE went as far as alleging that the UAE supported and financed the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016.³³

Against this background, reconciliation efforts have so far been most successful and swift with the UAE. In fact, both the UAE and Saudi Arabia initially seemed very reluctant to reconcile with Turkey.³⁴ This situation changed very quickly towards the end of 2021, when the UAE, similar to Turkey, underwent a major transformation in its approach to regional pol­icies and launched a diplomatic charm offensive on many fronts.³⁵ MBZ visited Turkey in November 2021 – a move reciprocated by Erdoğan in February 2022.³⁶ Erdoğan was welcomed with a lavish ceremony in Abu Dhabi, and the outcome of these two state-level visits was the signing of several Memoranda of Under­standing as well as a currency swap agreement to­talling US$5 billion. The UAE also pledged to invest a total of US$10 billion in the Turkish economy.³⁷

These initiatives gained momentum following Erdoğan’s election on 28 May. Just three days later, the UAE ratified the Comprehensive Economic Part­nership Agreement (CEPA) signed in March 2023. The agreement aims to increase bilateral trade to US$40 billion. In addition, MBZ was the first leader to visit Turkey after Erdoğan’s election victory.³⁸

This rapid process of reconciliation was unexpect­ed, given Turkey’s past perception of the UAE as its arch enemy in the region. However, despite the heated rhetoric between the two countries, bilateral issues before the reconciliation were one-dimensional and did not involve other actors. Moreover, unlike in Syria and Egypt, where ideological differences often serve as a cover for deep-seated geopolitical and strategic differences, in Turkey-UAE relations it was essentially an ideological difference that pitted the two countries against each other. For example, during the attempts by the Saudis and UAE to roll back Iran, Turkey, and movements linked to the MB, it was clear that Saudi Arabia saw Iran as an existential threat, while the UAE focused on political Islamist groups linked to the MB.³⁹

This ideological divide came to an end partly because the UAE no longer felt threatened by the forces unleashed by the Arab uprisings, especially Islamists. More importantly, Erdoğan has proved flexible in his support for the MB. As already men­tioned, the UAE (along with Saudi Arabia) halted the normalisation of relations with Turkey in 2021, partly to see whether Turkey would meet the Egyptian regime’s demands regarding the MB. Only later did positive reactions from Abu Dhabi begin to emerge.

Economic and security cooperation with the UAE holds the potential for realignment.

In fact, among all of Turkey’s reconciliation initiatives, the one with the UAE has the highest potential to turn into an important alliance, largely due to the overlapping needs and expectations of the two coun­tries.

This is most evident in the economic sphere. With economic benefits being a key driver of Turkey’s recon­ciliation efforts, the UAE, with its significant economic power, has emerged as an important ally. In the short term, this reconciliation has been crucial for addressing Turkey’s growing financial challenges. Although the UAE’s swap deals are smaller compared to those from Qatar and Russia, the UAE supports Tur­key’s economy in other ways. According to Bloom­berg, two UAE banks, Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank and Emirates NBD, arranged 61 per cent of all syn­dicated loans in the first half of 2023.⁴⁰ Securing UAE financing is vital for Turkey, as Western lenders are growing increasingly cautious due to Erdoğan’s un­orthodox economic policies.

Turkey’s expectations for bilateral economic rela­tions extend beyond lending from the UAE and include trade and investment. Before relations soured during the Arab Spring, the UAE was Turkey’s largest Gulf trading partner. Following the recent thaw, bilateral trade increased by 40 per cent between 2021 and 2022, and the CEPA agreement is set to boost trade further. Energy cooperation is also deepening, with Alparslan Bayraktar, Turkey’s Minister of Energy, highlighting the UAE as a strategic partner in Tur­key’s energy transition and carbon-neutrality efforts.⁴¹ Overall, the UAE has shown a greater willingness than Saudi Arabia to leverage its economic influence and made significant investment and trade commitments.

Moreover, this is not a one-dimensional economic relationship. The poor state of the Turkish economy and the collapse of the Turkish lira make Turkish com­panies particularly attractive for mergers and acqui­sitions, while Turkey’s substantial population guarantees a large market. All signs point to long-term UAE investment plans in Turkey – particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, logistics, technology, and defence – as part of the UAE’s agenda to diver­sify its economy beyond the carbon sector.

Cooperation in the economic sphere has the potential to spill over into the geopolitical sphere and espe­cially into security cooperation. Turkey clearly wants to play a more important role in the region’s security architecture and has already demonstrated its com­mit­ment and credibility with the blockade of Qatar. Moreover, the Gulf region in general is an important market for Turkey’s growing defence sector. Before the collapse of bilateral relations, the UAE and Saudi Arabia emerged as the second and third largest cus­tomers for Turkey’s defence exports between 2011 and 2016, representing around 20 per cent of Ankara’s defence exports.⁴²

In turn, the UAE is seeking to increase the number of partners in the region, especially as it decouples from Saudi Arabia.⁴³ In this context, the UAE has approached Iran almost simultaneously with Turkey as part of its regional charm offensive.⁴⁴ As with Turkey, the UAE has made more progress than Saudi Arabia in its rapprochement with Iran. In this con­text, good relations with Turkey are also important for the UAE, especially given Turkey’s role as a rising security actor and arms supplier in the region.⁴⁵

Reconciliation also means geopolitical rapproche­ment. Since, unlike Saudi Arabia (or Israel), neither country sees Iran as an existential enemy, both coun­tries already had a common position towards Iran. The most important outcome of the reconciliation was the reduction in tensions between Turkey and the UAE in Libya.⁴⁶ Although neither country has significantly changed its positions, both are reaching out to rival factions in Libya. The UAE in particular has abandoned its hardline policy and is engaging with the Dbeibah government in the west without renouncing its support for the forces in eastern Libya. During the 2023 Champions League Final in Turkey, Erdoğan facilitated a brief meeting between MBZ and Libya’s Dbeibah, similar to the Erdoğan-Sisi meeting brokered by Qatar’s Emir at the World Cup.⁴⁷

While bilateral relations between the UAE and Turkey have improved significantly, the extent and future of this reconciliation will also depend on the dynamics between the UAE and Qatar. With rapid growth in economic relations, the UAE could soon surpass Qatar as Turkey’s primary economic partner in the region. Although Turkey’s deepening ties with the UAE may not be welcomed by Qatar, in this new era of multiple alignments, Doha might lack the influence – or even the desire – to prevent Ankara from strengthening its relationship with Abu Dhabi. However, if tensions between Qatar and the UAE were to resurface, it would pose a significant obstacle to the further development of Turkey-UAE relations. Despite the progress made, the UAE’s relationship with Turkey is unlikely to reach the level of the Turk­ish-Qatari alliance, which is built on deep personal ties and a history of shared stances in regional con­flicts.⁴⁸ Therefore, if Turkey is forced to choose sides, as it was during the Qatari blockade, it is likely to stand by Qatar.

The uncertainty of reconciliation with Saudi Arabia

Turkish-Saudi relations also collapsed due to both countries being on opposite sides of the Arab Spring. However, while singling out UAE as the counterrevolutionary force, Turkey tried to preserve its good rela­tions with Saudi Arabia. For instance, Turkey worried about Iranian gains during the Arab Spring, initially supported Saudi Arabia’s military intervention in Yemen, and accused Iran of trying to dominate the region by using sectarian policies.⁴⁹

However, Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia received a severe blow with the Qatar blockade im­posed by the Arab Quartet and Turkey’s backing of Qatar. In reaction, Saudi Arabia immediately started to give diplomatic and military support to the YPG forces in Syria.⁵⁰ Tensions escalated when a prominent Saudi journalist and regime critic, Jamal Khashoggi, was murdered by Saudi operatives in Saudi Arabia’s Istanbul Consulate. Turkey skilfully and slowly leaked evidence of a gruesome murder committed by the Saudi operatives, linking it to the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) and thereby undermining his international credibility. However, MBS weathered political pressures, par­ticularly due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Tur­key also began to take an increasingly critical tone on the Yemeni operation, which it had supported back in 2015.⁵¹ In response, Saudi Arabia deepened its military cooperation with Greece⁵² and introduced an unofficial trade ban towards Turkey that reduced Turkish exports to almost zero.⁵³

Once the reconciliation processes commenced, Saudi Arabia proved more intransigent than the UAE. Emboldened by the quick and successful rapprochement with the UAE, Erdoğan announced on 3 January 2022 that he would visit the Saudi kingdom on the following month. However, this visit never materialised, as the Saudis never offered the invitation. Erdo­ğan managed to visit Saudi Arabia only after the Turkish court processing the murder of Khashoggi announced that the case would be transferred to Saudi Arabia. On 28 April 2022, three weeks after this announcement, Erdoğan made his first trip to Saudi Arabia since the Qatar blockade in 2017. Aside from meeting with King Salman, Erdoğan also met with MBS, signalling that tensions due to the Khashoggi case had passed. MBS reciprocated the visit on June 2022. However, unlike with the UAE, no significant agreement was signed between Turkey and Saudi Arabia during these official visits. Only much later – two months before the Turkish elections – Saudi Arabia agreed to make a US$5 billion deposit to the Turkish Central Bank.⁵⁴ This remained the most con­crete outcome of the Turkish-Saudi reconciliation prior to Turkish elections, along with the removal of an unofficial trade ban imposed by Saudi Arabia on Turkish goods.

The Saudis have been much more hesitant than the UAE to improve relations, despite sharing a similar economic and security profile.

Since the elections, however, there have been more concrete developments in economic relations, such as the return of Turkish construction companies to Saudi Arabia⁵⁵ and the signing of the largest defence export deal in Turkish history between the Saudi Min­istry of Defence and Baykar Technologies on the pur­chase of Turkish drones.⁵⁶ Overall, however, the Saudis have been much slower and more hesitant than the UAE to improve relations. This is despite shar­ing char­acteristics that could pave the way for fur­ther reconciliation, such as the complementarity of both economies, Saudi Arabia’s cash surplus economy and need to invest in non-oil businesses, Turkey’s urgent need for foreign exchange, Saudi Arabia’s quest to find more security partners, and Tur­key’s desire to emerge as a security actor in the region.

In the economic realm, this is not a novelty. Turkey-UAE economic relations have been historically ahead of Turkey-Saudi relations,⁵⁷ and with the recent signing of the free trade agreement it will improve further. In contrast, even before relations broke down, Turkey and Saudi Arabia maintained hardly any economic relations.⁵⁸ While minimal economic rela­tions can signal untapped potential, it requires addi­tional political will to tap that potential – in that regard, Riyadh seems to be lagging behind Abu Dhabi.

One explanation of course is the size of the respective countries: As a small country, the UAE can be more agile in its foreign policy. This difference in the speed with which the two countries can act is also visible in their reconciliation with other countries, such as with Israel and Iran. It is highly likely that the very personal feud between Erdoğan and MBS over the Kashoggi case also lingers. Relatedly, despite its economic might, the UAE cannot make a claim of regional leadership due to its sheer lack of size, where­as Turkey and Saudi Arabia are rivalling for the role of leadership of Sunni Islam in particular, and the Muslim world in general.

Moreover, a deepening of ties between Ankara and Riyadh would significantly alter the balance of power in the region and would signal a threat to Tehran, in a way Turkey-UAE reconciliation does not.⁵⁹ Given that all parties are striving for de-escalation and regional stability, that is not a message any of the capi­tals would like to send. Hence, an additional layer of caution. Riyadh is being careful in co-ordinating its reconciliation efforts with Turkey, Israel, and Iran and not leaning too much in any direction. Overall, although both countries seem to be leaving the era of tensions behind, it is not clear as to what degree they will continue their reconciliation efforts.

Collapsed reconciliation with Israel

Turkey’s relations with Israel started to deteriorate much earlier than with other countries in the region. The first major crisis between Turkey and Israel erupted in 2010 after the infamous “Mavi Marmara incident”, in which a Turkish faith-based NGO, İnsani Yardım Vakfı (IHH), tried to break Israel’s naval blockade to the Gaza Strip by delivering aid from the sea. Israeli soldiers boarded the Mavi Marmara – the flagship of the aid convoy – and killed nine Turkish citizens.⁶⁰ Relations broke down until a reconciliation was reached in 2013. However, bilateral relations never fully recovered and remained tense due to Tur­key’s championing of the Palestinian cause and the Islamist movements in the region. A second collapse in bilateral relations came in 2018, following the killing of 60 Palestinians by Israeli security forces during protests against the US decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem. Ankara reacted harshly and expelled the Israeli ambassador, prompting Israel to retaliate.⁶¹

Similar to Syria and Egypt, relations with Israel also began to recover initially due to contact being initiated between intelligence services. Joint operations, such as those countering Iranian threats to Israeli tourists in Turkey, accelerated reconciliation.⁶² Success in intelligence cooperation facilitated diplo­matic reconciliation efforts. The departure of Benja­min Netanyahu, with whom Erdoğan had a long and hostile relationship, removed another impediment to diplomatic reconciliation. In March 2022, Israel’s president, Isaac Herzog, visited Turkey, marking the first high-level visit since 2008, and he was welcomed by a full military procession in Erdoğan’s palace. Later, the contact made between Prime Minister Yair Lapid and Erdoğan as well as between the respective foreign ministers gave more substance to Herzog’s mostly ceremonial visit.

Reconciliation attempts were first put to the test during the spring seasons of 2022 and 2023, when violent clashes between Palestinians and Israelis typically increase during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. This time, Turkey skilfully ignored these violent clashes and muted its criticism of Israel, demonstrating seriousness in improving its relations with Israel. Both countries announced a full restoration of diplomatic relations and an exchange of am­bassadors in 17 August 2022.⁶³ Even the re-election of Netanyahu in November 2022 did not affect the reconciliation process between the two countries, and Erdoğan and Netanyahu met face to face in New York on September 2023.

Turkey showed eagerness for reconciliation with Israel as it serves as a strategic move for Turkey to alleviate its isolation in the eastern Mediterranean. Reconciliation with Israel is also important regarding the optics of Erdoğan’s regime in the West. Ankara recognises the significance of Israel’s support in miti­gating the opposition that is prevalent in the US Con­gress due to long-standing anti-Turkish sentiments. Moreover, reconciliation with Israel is the most sig­nifi­cant demonstration of Erdoğan’s seriousness in initiating a new era of foreign policy that is based more on pragmatism and moderation.

Reconciliation is also linked, at least indirectly, to Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Iran. While Turkish-Iranian relations traditionally swing between restrained rivalry and limited cooperation, the col­lapses of the Syrian and Iraqi nation states transformed this calculus and pitted the two regional heavy­weights against each other in a spiral of con­flict.⁶⁴ The fact that Turkey is entering a period of tense and conflictual relations with Iran makes Turkey a tempting ally for the anti-Iranian countries in the region, and particularly Israel. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the reconciliation process started with intelligence cooperation directed against Iran. Both countries’ mutual support for Azerbaijan in the Azeri-Armenian conflict and potential coopera­tion in the South Caucasus is another dimension of their shared anti-Iranian position and has been a facilitator of their reconciliation. However, although Turkish-Iranian relations are deteriorating, Turkey does not share Israel’s views on Iran either. For Israel, Iran is an existential threat, whereas for Turkey it is merely a rival.

Finally, Turkish-Israeli relations can gain a very strong economic dimension in the long term if both countries develop a cooperative relationship on the eastern Mediterranean gas fields. A gas pipeline that would deliver Israeli gas to Turkey and from Turkey to Europe would have a lasting impact on bilateral relations. The project is economically attractive as well, since transporting gas through pipelines is cheaper than the current mode of transport, which goes through liquefied natural gas facilities in Egypt. A pipeline from Israeli gas fields to Turkey would cost up to €1.5 billion and would be much more realistic than the now largely defunct €6 billion EastMed pipe­line project designed to link Israel to Cyprus, Greece, and Italy.⁶⁵ However, even before 7 October, politics stood in the way of economic cooperation. Turkey is more enthusiastic for this project, as Erdoğan has repeatedly stated his readiness for energy cooperation between the two countries.⁶⁶ Turkish-Israeli rapproche­ment, however, has never reached a level that could commit Israel to a long-lasting economic co­opera­tion that would “create an interdependency in favour of Turkey”.⁶⁷ Therefore, Israel, on several occasions, has postponed the planned visits of Turkey’s energy minis­ter until political relations are more developed.⁶⁸ However, bilateral talks regarding energy cooperation are suspended for the time being due to tensions in Turkey-Israel relations as a result of Israel’s operations in Gaza.

Personalisation of the regimes

Aside from political, economic, and structural factors, personal factors also play a large role in determining the future of these reconciliation efforts. This may not be surprising, given that political life and deci­sion-making in all the countries mentioned are becom­ing increasingly personalised. Personalism can be defined as “the dominance of the political realm by a single individual. (In personalist politics) leaders themselves are disproportionately influential on pol­icies and outcomes, often at the expense of rules and institutions.”⁷⁷ Several studies have shown that the rise of personalism is a global phenomenon that is common among democracies and autocracies alike.⁷⁸ Similarly, Turkey has evolved from being an electoral democracy to a personalist autocracy. In this process, Turkey’s executive system has also shifted from a parliamen­tary system to a hyper-presidential system, in which all power is concentrated in the hands of the presi­dent.⁷⁹ The personalisation of politics can also be observed in countries with which Turkey is aiming for reconciliation. In fact, personalism may be ex­pected of monarchies, where the regime type dictates it. However, the personalisation of power exhibited by MBS and MBZ is exceptional, even when consider­ing the standards of the UAE and Saudi Arabia.⁸⁰ More­over, Egypt has also evolved from a military autocracy into a personalistic autocracy. Even in Israel, Netanyahu’s stint as the longest-serving prime minister weakened institutions and led to the emer­gence of a personalistic government.⁸¹

The personalistic nature of these regimes has impacted reconciliation attempts differently. In the UAE, MBZ’s pragmatism has facilitated rapid recon­ciliation, whereas the personal grudges of Sisi and MBS have hindered progress with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. MBS delayed Erdoğan’s visit to Saudi Arabia to have Erdoğan concede publicly, and Sisi insisted on a personal meeting with Erdoğan before moving forward.⁸² In Israel, reconciliation efforts progressed after Netanyahu’s departure, with both sides ex­changing ambassadors before the 2022 elections to avoid any stalling under a potential return of Netan­yahu.⁸³ Overall, personalism points to a significant weakness of the reconciliation process: the weak institutional foundations.⁸⁴

Reconciliation processes are fragile due to highly personalised regimes and unpredictable leaders.

This raises another problem regarding the future and durability of attempts at reconciliation. Sudden changes in direction are common in personalised regimes. Autocrats tend to shift their policies quickly. Moreover, even if the leader remains committed to his policies, the future of these policies is intrinsically linked to the life span of the leader and his ability to remain in power. Hence, it does not allow for the emergence of a long-term regional political alliance or security architecture.

Elite-based processes

A fundamental weakness of all current reconciliation efforts in the Middle East is that they lack a people-to-people dimension. Despite a significant body of litera­ture pointing to the importance of the people-to-people dimension as an effective and complementary form of diplomacy⁸⁷ as well as a “useful conflict resolution strategy”⁸⁸ for reducing hostile inter-state relations, reconciliation efforts in the region to date have been limited to interactions at the level of political elites without popular participation. Moreover, there are no mechanisms designed to increase people-to-people involvement, such as tourism and education to help people move between one country and another.

Similarly, Turkey’s reconciliation efforts are also taking place at a time when anti-Arab sentiments are running high in the Turkish public. Turkey is hosting the world’s largest refugee population, as 3.6 million Syrians are currently residing in Turkey.⁸⁹ Although the Turkish public had generally been welcoming in the early years of the conflict, anti-refugee sentiments have risen to higher levels in recent years due to the deepening economic crisis, rising unemployment rates, and the realisation that most Syrians are no longer tem­porary guests but destined to stay. Anti-Syrian rhetoric soon translated into anti-Arabism.⁹⁰ Simultaneously, the visibility of rich Arabs, mostly from the Gulf region, and resentment towards them has also contrib­uted to rampant anti-Arabism among the public.⁹¹

While Turkish public opinion always favored Pales­tinians in the Israel-Palestine conflict, the recent war and the associated brutality has only helped to in­crease anti-Israeli sentiments and even led to in­stances of anti-Semitism. Without a people-to-people dimension, it is almost impossible for the process to lead to a stable regional peace project.

Domestic political constraints

Despite the elitist nature of the reconciliation pro­cesses, domestic political considerations also have a certain importance. This situation has so far been clearly seen in the efforts to normalise relations with Israel. While the Arab public’s opposition to Israel’s war on Gaza has kept these regimes from proceeding with the normalisation of relations with Israel, the issue is more acute in Turkey, not because the Pal­es­tinian cause carries more weight in Turkey than in the Arab countries, but because Erdoğan has to win elections and thus has to consider public sentiment more than Arab autocrats do.

Despite the fact that Turkey is no longer classified as a democracy by any of the indices,⁹² it is often considered to be a competitive authoritarian regime, which means that elections still play a big role in Turkish politics. Erdoğan has a remarkable track record of continuous electoral victories, but he relies on a slim majority. In the last presidential election, in May 2023, he could not secure victory in the first round, and in the second round he only won with 52 per cent of the vote. Moreover, in the 2024 local elections, the AKP came in second place for the first time since its founding in 2001, and alarm bells began ringing about Erdoğan’s political future.⁹³

Despite Erdoğan’s desire not to forgo efforts to normalise relations with Israel by supporting the Palestinian cause, he is being forced to do so, in no small part due to his domestic competitor’s quite public adoption of the Palestinian line. As said before, even though Erdoğan made calls for restraint in the early days of the conflict, he eventually changed track.

In order to understand how domestic politics is con­straining Erdoğan’s moves, one also has to ac­knowl­edge the radical transformation of the religious-conservative party landscape in Turkey. Unlike a few years ago, today there are a plethora of actors and par­ties competing for the votes of Turkey’s large reli­gious-conservative constituency. Throughout the last two decades, the AKP has been the main actor repre­senting the religious-conservative vote. The only other party with some strength has been the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party), which has either failed to enter the parliament or has been represented in the parliament by one or two MPs. However, other than the AKP, there are four other Islamist-conservative parties in the Turkish parliament today: Hüda-Par (Free Cause Party), Yeniden Refah (New Welfare Party), Gelecek (Future Party) and Saadet Partisi. In the most recent conflict, all four parties have raised the issue of Pal­estine, to the potential dislike of Erdoğan, thereby forcing him to take a clearer stance, which jeopardises the process of normalising relations with Israel. In the foreseeable future, they will continue to exert constraint over Erdoğan’s policies towards Israel.

Limitations of economic relations

Economic expectations have been a key driver of Turkey’s regional reconciliation efforts, partly ex­plaining the faster progress with the UAE and Saudi Arabia as compared to the slower pace with Syria, Egypt, and Israel. This is not only because these countries lack economies of size, but also because Turkey’s relations with Egypt and Israel have already been compartmentalised, to the extent that economic relations were not harmed throughout the decade of conflict. As stated above, trade with Egypt remained relatively stable,⁹⁴ and Turkey even experienced a boom with Israel.⁹⁵

In contrast, economic relations with the two Gulf countries have great potential, both in the short and long terms. In the time leading up to the May 2023 elections in Turkey, both countries extended Erdoğan a helping hand, but not at a level that would ensure electoral victory. Moreover, the US$5 billion provided by each country to the Turkish Central Bank, either in the form of swap agreements or loans, pales in com­parison to similar agreements that Turkey made with Russia, Qatar, and China. Therefore, one could say that reconciliation efforts with the two Gulf countries have only partially met expectations in the short run.

Beyond cash injections, the UAE and Saudi Arabia present significant economic potential for trade and investment with Turkey. Notable developments include Saudi Arabia lifting its unofficial trade ban on Turkish goods and the UAE signing the CEPA agreement with Turkey, which is also expecting sig­nifi­cant investment from these two economies with cash surpluses. So far, Saudi Arabia has refrained from making commitments regarding investment, whereas the UAE has already made significant promises of investment in Turkey, having pledged at least US$10 billion. However, it is not uncommon for the Gulf countries to throw around big numbers for PR purposes. Although the recent collapse of the Turk­ish lira makes Turkish companies and assets financially attractive, only a small fraction of these investments have materialised thus far.⁹⁶ This was also true with Qatar – Turkey’s long-time ally – which never matched the high numbers it promised. Gulf countries remain cautious, partly due to doubts about Erdoğan’s commitment to economic rationality.⁹⁷

Based on the state of bilateral economic relations, one could conclude that Gulf countries’ support for the Erdoğan regime is significant but cautious. Whether the reconciliation efforts can be sustained in the long run will be at least partially determined by the level of long-term economic cooperation.

Exaggerated expectations in terms of foreign policy benefits

Turkey’s reconciliation efforts have partly been driven by its desire to overcome isolation in the eastern Mediterranean, where it has longstanding tensions with Greece and Cyprus. A key goal of Turk­ish foreign policy is to prevent external actors such as the United States and the European Union (EU) from getting involved in these disputes. How­ever, in recent years, Greece and Cyprus have strength­ened ties with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, forming alliances that include security and economic co­opera­tion. These countries have conducted joint military drills, deepened security ties, and established the EMGF – excluding Turkey. They have also resolved maritime boundaries among themselves to manage potential natural gas resources. Turkey is now aiming to divide this alliance through its reconciliation efforts. In fact, Turkish officials have been quite out­spoken about the link between Turkey’s reconciliation efforts with these four countries and Greece’s improving relations with them. For instance, Ibrahim Kalin, former presidential spokesperson and now head of the intelligence, framed the reconciliation processes as a response to Greek attempts to increase its influence in the eastern Mediterranean.⁹⁸ Com­ment­ing on the reconciliation process with Egypt, Erdoğan clearly stated that all that Turkey is demanding from Egypt is to reconsider its eastern Mediterranean policy.⁹⁹ In contrast, both Israel and Egypt have repeatedly stated that their ongoing reconciliation attempts with Turkey will not undermine their alli­ance with Greece and Cyprus.¹⁰⁰ Even Saudi Arabia, which does not have a direct stake in the east Medi­terranean conflict, has been careful to maintain strong relations with Greece. One month after visiting Turkey, MBS also paid a visit to Greece. Unlike the crown prince’s visit to Turkey, 17 bilateral agreements were signed during this visit, including one on the installation of an electricity cable between the two countries that would, according to MBS, provide Europe with much cheaper energy.¹⁰¹ Therefore, it is clear that Turkey will have a hard time breaking up the newly established alliances of Greece and Cyprus in the region. Overall, how these four countries – and particularly Israel and Egypt – react to Turkish demands regarding the Mediterranean will largely shape the future and extent of their reconciliation efforts.

Even though currently lukewarm relations between Turkey and Greece have pushed this dimension to the backburner, potential Turkish-Greek tensions in the future will be a litmus test for Turkey’s insist­ence on the reconciliation processes. At the moment, it seems that Turkey’s expectations are too high.

Risk of authoritarian consolidation

Another potential problem that may arise from the ongoing rapprochement process is the risk of authori­tarian consolidation. Reconciliation between rival actors in foreign policy is also driven by autocratic leaders’ desire to focus on consolidating their rule at home.¹⁰³ With regard to the domestic politics of these countries, reconciliation efforts serve to mute domes­tic critics and increase autocratic consolidation. This can happen in three ways. First, the regimes that prioritise domestic stability will now be able to invest the large amounts of money they had spent on region­al adventures towards strengthening their con­trol over their populations, either through suppression or rent distribution. Second, by agreeing not to harm each other, they will silence the media orga­ni­sations criticising rival regimes. And finally, through reconciliation efforts, these regimes may cooperate to suppress political dissent and increase their autocratic grip over their populations.

In order to normalise relations with Saudi Arabia, Turkey dropped the Khashoggi case, and in order to appease the Egyptian government, it silenced Egyptian media channels in Istanbul. Moreover, the MB diaspora currently residing in Turkey now faces the danger of extradition. There are already unverified accounts of Turkey deporting certain individuals to Egypt, where they would not face fair trials.¹⁰⁴ Fear­ing such a scenario, these individuals might consider leaving Turkey and seek political asylum in Europe.¹⁰⁵

On the reverse side, the UAE has silenced Sedat Peker, a mafia boss close to Erdoğan who turned into a whistleblower. Throughout the summer of 2021, Peker had broadcasted nine videos over YouTube in which he exposed several criminal acts and human rights violations by the Erdoğan regime.¹⁰⁶ As each video reached an audience of five to ten million viewers, these videos became the central topic of pub­lic debate for months and pushed Erdoğan regime into a corner. Peker also promised to broadcast new videos before the presidential elections that would have even more significant revelations about the crimi­nal dossier of the Erdoğan regime. As part of the process of reconciliation with the UAE, Ankara has ensured that the UAE will prevent Peker from shoot­ing new videos or releasing new political scandals. This underscores how reconciliation between authori­tarian regimes can facilitate transnational repression, helping them control domestic narratives and deepen authoritarian practices.

Intelligence cooperation is another dimension of authoritarian consolidation. In fact, it was due to con­tact made behind the scenes between intelligence or­ga­nisations that initiated several reconciliation efforts in the first place. Although intelligence co­opera­tion may help countries better coordinate against criminal activities and security threats, a downside is that some­times it can lead to better cooperation between these regimes in repressing political dissent. Through intelligence cooperation, these regimes will improve their surveillance capabilities and increase their auto­cratic grip. One well-known example is when Israel provided the Pegasus spyware programme to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Through this program, these regimes hacked the phones of several journalists and political dissidents and managed to keep their activities under surveillance.¹⁰⁷

Overall, although the reconciliation process is un­likely to translate into a stabilised autocratic regional system – due to the personalised and unstable natures of the regimes – it will clearly help autocratic con­solidation in each and every country.

Recommendations

Although these challenges remain to be addressed, the war on Gaza has also demonstrated that the EU and Germany have limited political clout in the region. Moreover, the war has not only significantly damaged the credibility of Europe and Germany in the region, but also in Turkey, where people are accusing Germany and Europe of unconditionally supporting Israel’s human rights abuses.¹⁰⁸

Nevertheless, there are still options for handling the reconciliation process. Given the several potential pitfalls, the Middle East should not disappear from the political agenda of Europe. These reconciliation processes need to be monitored closely, and de-esca­lation mechanisms need to be built in order to pre­vent any potential challenges to diplomatic processes. Furthermore, multilateral frameworks similar to the Berlin Process¹⁰⁹ and the Baghdad Summit¹¹⁰ need to be developed in order to support the diplomatic efforts for a rapprochement. Such initiatives and venues can serve as mechanisms of de-escalation and conflict management while also serving as a platform to discuss and deepen regional cooperation. Regional ownership of the processes is particularly important. The EU should also strengthen central governance structures in fragile countries such as Lebanon and Iraq to prevent these countries from becoming battle­grounds for proxy wars. A more coherent EU policy is required for these processes to be effective.

The EU can also support the development of exist­ing regional frameworks, above all, the EMGF. The integration of Turkey into a renewed EMGF is crucial for long-term stability. Turkey’s exclusion from the Forum spurred more aggressive policies, and its in­clusion could establish a multilateral framework for resolving issues with regional actors, particularly Greece. Such frameworks are vital, as they prevent unilateral solutions and reduce tensions. Collaboration in the energy sector, particularly in renewables such as offshore wind energy and green hydrogen, could mitigate divergences between Turkey and Greece. The EU could lead the creation of a new multi­lateral framework or expand the EMGF to facil­itate the energy transition in the region.

Turkey’s integration into this energy transition framework could also positively impact Libya by im­proving the prospects for a political solution. Energy deals – including the possibility of establishing an Israel-Turkey gas pipeline after the Gaza war – could further political reconciliation, contingent on the design of Turkey’s role as either a transit country or a major market for Israeli gas. Such a design would create mutual dependency on energy resources and could represent a significant step towards a sustain­able reconciliation.

Given the primacy of the economy as a driving force in reconciliation processes, Europe can learn from the examples of the UAE and Saudi Arabia using their economic powers to push Turkey towards politi­cal and geostrategic convergence. It has long become a cliché to argue that relations between Turkey and the EU fundamentally changed because the EU lost all its leverage vis-à-vis Turkey as its prospects for EU membership faded. However, just as the need to find economic support from the rich Gulf countries is cur­rently forcing Turkey to re-evaluate some of its pol­icies in the Middle East, Europe can also use its eco­nomic power to exert pressure on Turkey. This became particularly important in the post-election period in Turkey. Prior to the presidential elections in May 2023, Erdoğan’s economic management had short-term goals that were aimed at sustaining the economy and increasing public spending until elec­tion time through cash inflows from his old and new allies. However, now Erdoğan has to address the structural problems in Turkey’s economy such as a high current account deficit, low Central Bank reserves, and high inflation. Earthquakes in Turkey in February 2023 further worsened this situation.

Although Erdoğan’s attempts to find foreign financing, mostly through swap deals, merely helped him to buy time, economic restructuring will require sustained credit inflows and FDI on a much larger scale. Although the inflated numbers coming from the Gulf countries may appear to be an important economic source, their actual realisation suggests that they are not sufficient. Turkey will have to knock on the door of Western countries or international finan­cial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to receive the necessary amount of credit. Moreover, being aware that IMF credit comes with political conditionalities, Turkey has been pushing for credit from the World Bank instead.¹¹¹ Europe and its transatlantic partners should not waste this unique opportunity and use this leverage to re-create political and strategic convergence between Turkey and Europe/ the West. Although it is unrealistic to bring Turkey back onto the list of democratic countries, by making economic aid and loans conditional on politi­cal cir­cumstances, Turkey can to some extent be brought back towards the rule of law. At the very least, the EU could insist that Turkey must abide by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, which it has recently started to ignore. Furthermore, this could prevent Turkey from becoming even more distant to the Western geopolitical sphere.

The EU can also counter some of the negative effects of reconciliation leading to authoritarian con­solida­tion in the region by expanding protection pro­grammes for opposition actors. Previous rivalries between regional autocrats provided safe havens and the nec­essary room to manoeuvre for opposition forces, political activists, journalists as well as the per­secuted communities of each country. With rapproche­ment, they all face the danger of being silenced and extra­dited. Although this is a cost to bear, European states can compensate by more care­fully monitoring the fate of political refugees and critical voices and by acting as a safe third country for them.

This raises serious concerns in EU circles, in particular with regard to members of the MB residing in Turkey. Fearing that Turkey will no longer protect them from the wrath of the Sisi regime, these people may rush to obtain political asylum in Germany and other European countries. Given the hardening immi­gration policies in Germany and other EU countries, should this be a concern for German policy-makers? In light of the current state of reconciliation between Turkey and Egypt and considering the migration pat­terns, there is not much room for concern. First of all, most of the high-profile MB members have already received Turkish citizenship. Although there are reports of some of these citizenships being re­voked,¹¹² it is unclear how widespread these revocations will be. Moreover, revocation does not automat­ically lead to extradition. At this stage, Erdoğan seems to be leveraging revocation or the threat of revocation to control the MB, while simultaneously using the move­ment as a bargaining chip in his foreign rela­tions. It would also make more sense for Sisi to en­sure that Erdoğan keeps them under control and pacifies them, rather than have them be extradited to Egypt. Finally, even when MB members do migrate to Europe, Lon­don appears to be the favourite destination due to earlier patterns of immigration and an already existing network of members. Thus, an MB exodus towards Germany and the EU seems highly unlikely. However, irrespective of this, the EU should take principled action regarding asylum applications from opposition actors in regional authoritarian countries and uphold asylum rights for those at risk as well as adhere to asylum laws and the Refugee Convention. It should grant these rights to individuals who would undoubtedly be deprived of a fair trial in their home countries. Finally, in addition to granting asylum, Europe could develop programmes to enable some mem­bers of the opposition, such as academics, jour­nalists, and civil society activists, to pursue their pro­fessions and activities from Europe. In this context, Germany’s Philip Schwartz programme for exiled academics is a successful example that could be emulated by other European countries.